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EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE
REGULATION: TIME TO START OVER
Paul G. Mahoney*

ABSTRACT
Over the past half century, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC)’s regulations have become key determinants of the way in which stocks
trade and the fees that exchanges charge for their services. The current equity
market structure rules are contained primarily in the SEC’s Regulation NMS.
The theory behind Regulation NMS is that a system of dispersed markets
operating pursuant to SEC-mandated information and order routing links will
provide the benefits of consolidation and competition simultaneously.
This article argues that Regulation NMS has failed in that quest. It has
produced fragmented markets and created questionable incentives for market
participants, possibly producing socially excessive investments in trading
speed and secrecy. It also discourages exchange innovation, provides
insufficient incentives for traders to price orders aggressively, requires
brokers to act against their customers’ interests, and forces the SEC to act as a
price regulator.
The article contends that the SEC should replace Regulation NMS with
three simple design principles—issuer choice, exchange autonomy, and
regulatory consistency. These would allow market forces, rather than
regulatory mandates, to determine the design and pricing of trading platforms
and the trading strategies of broker-dealers. They would better align the
private incentives of trading platforms with the social objectives of improving
liquidity and price discovery.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A typical large-company stock may trade simultaneously on more than a
dozen regulated exchanges, on electronic markets regulated as broker-dealers,
and through dealers transacting outside the organized markets. 1 This fragmented structure arose in part because technology enabled investors and intermediaries to design new solutions to traditional trading challenges. 2 It also arose in
part because Congress and the SEC made regulatory choices that encouraged
the proliferation of trading markets and the resulting fragmentation of trading. 3
These choices were not the result of a comprehensive design process. Regulators responded to problems and ideas as they arose. The regulatory evolution
culminated with the SEC’s adoption of Regulation NMS in 2005. 4 Regulation
NMS and related market structure rules embody three design principles. First,

1. See Ryan J. Davies & Erik R. Sirri, The Economics of Trading Markets, in SECURITIES
MARKET ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 145, 154 (Merritt B. Fox et al. eds., 2018).
2. See James J. Angel, Lawrence E. Harris & Chester S. Spatt, Equity Trading in the 21st
Century, 1 Q. J. FIN. 1, 2–3 (2011) (“[I]nvestor demands for better solutions to the trading problems
that they have traditionally faced—and will always face—largely drove the innovations.”).
3. See, e.g., Daniel Gallagher, How to Reform Equity Market Structure: Eliminate “Reg
NMS” and Build Venture Exchanges, HERITAGE FOUND. (2017), https://www.heritage.org/article
/how-reform-equity-market-structure-eliminate-reg-nms-and-build-venture-exchanges (“[I]n recent
years, changes to the structure of these markets have been driven as much, if not more, by legislative and regulatory action than by the private sector . . . .”); Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten &
Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 199–200
(2015); infra Part III.
4. See infra Part II.C.

Fall 2020]

Equity Market Structure Regulation

3

exchanges must facilitate brokers’ search for the best price by providing its “top
of book,” or best-priced quotations, to a central processor that sells data at a collectively determined price subject to SEC regulation. Second, trading centers
may not execute a trade at a price inferior to the best price displayed by the central processor. Third, any exchange may trade any public company stock.
The underlying logic of this design is that a system of separate but linked
markets should provide the best of all worlds. Consolidating trading on a single
market may improve liquidity and price discovery but facilitate monopoly pricing for access to quotations or trade execution. Fragmenting trading among
competing markets reduces pricing power, but possibly at the expense of liquidity and price discovery. The SEC believed that its separate-but-linked markets
paradigm would avoid these tradeoffs. 5
In this article, I argue that experience has not borne out the logic. Although
exchanges proliferated following the adoption of Regulation NMS, the resulting
structure is less competitive and less innovative than the sheer number of venues might suggest. All thirteen exchanges use the same market design. 6 The
proliferation of exchanges encourages investments in speed and secrecy that
may be excessive from a societal perspective. It also dulls traders’ incentives to
bid aggressively against one another rather than free riding on others’ price information. Regulation NMS requires brokers to sometimes act against their
customers’ best interests. It has put the SEC in the position of a price regulator,
a task to which it is not well-suited.
The Treasury Department and the SEC’s Chair and Director of the Division
of Trading and Markets have suggested various incremental revisions to Regulation NMS to address some of these concerns. 7 In October 2019, the SEC issued a public statement inviting exchanges to propose improvements in market
structure for thinly-traded companies, which could include exemptive relief
from Regulation NMS and from unlisted trading. 8 In early 2020, it proposed
that the exchanges revise the governance of the Equity Data Plans through
which the exchanges comply with their regulatory obligation to provide price

5. See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,499
(June 29, 2005) (noting that the SEC’s objective is to further “the distinct, but equally vital, benefits
associated with both competition among markets and competition among orders”).
6. See Eric Budish, Robin S. Lee & John J. Shim, A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition
and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market? 1, 4 (Becker Friedman Inst. for Econ. Uni. of Chi.,
Working Paper No. 2019-72, 2020).
7. See Press Release, Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y, & Craig S. Phillips, Couns. to the Sec’y,
Dep’t of the Treasury, A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities: Capital Markets
(Oct. 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/A-Financial-SystemCapital-Markets-FINAL-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Treasury Press Release]; see also Jay Clayton,
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n & Brett Redfearn, Div. of Trading & Mrkts. Dir., U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, Equity Market Structure 2019: Looking Back & Moving Forward, Remarks at
Fordham University Gabelli School of Business (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/clayton-redfearn-equity-market-structure-2019#_ftn2.
8. See Market Structure Innovation for Thinly Traded Securities, Exchange Act Release
No. 87,327, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,956, 56,957 (October 24, 2019).
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and quotation data to a consolidated processor. 9 More recently, it ordered the
exchanges to consolidate and revise the governance of the Equity Data Plans. 10
These proposals largely deal with the unintended consequences of Regulation
NMS as it was originally crafted.
This article advocates for a more fundamental rethinking of market structure
regulation. Regulation NMS should be scrapped and replaced with three alternative design principles: issuer choice, exchange autonomy, and regulatory consistency.
Issuers, not exchanges, should decide where their shares trade. There is no
universally accepted answer to the question of whether welfare is maximized by
centralizing all trading in a given stock on a single platform or allowing it to
trade on competing platforms. Public companies should be free to centralize
trading on a single exchange, spread it over all available platforms, or select
something in between. Those choices may reveal an optimal structure or show
that the best structure is a function of issuer characteristics.
Exchanges, not the SEC, should design their trading environments and the
terms of access to their quotations. Brokers, not exchanges, should be responsible for processing information and deciding which trading venue offers the best
available execution. Technology has made it possible to search multiple trading
platforms in a matter of milliseconds. Brokers’ reputational interest and legal
obligation to seek the best execution for their customers provide the incentive to
engage in that search.
The current system for regulating trading platforms distinguishes between
exchanges, which regulate their member brokers and listed companies, and alternative trading systems (ATS), which do not. Unlike an exchange, an ATS
need not display its quotations publicly unless it accounts for more than five
percent of trading in the relevant stock, which none currently does. 11 The distinction made sense in an era before Congress and the SEC had so thoroughly
occupied the fields of public company disclosure and governance and broker
misconduct. 12 Given the current regulatory framework for public companies

9. See Market Data Infrastructure, Exchange Act Release No. 88,216, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,726
(Mar. 24, 2020); see also Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open
Meeting on Proposed Order to Modernize the Governance Structure of National Market System
Plans for Equity Market Data (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statementclayton-open-meeting-2020-01-08 (citing “conflicts of interest between the exchanges’ commercial
objectives, on the one hand, and their regulatory obligations” as part of the motivation for the proposal).
10. See New National Market System Plan Regarding Consolidated Equity Market Data,
Exchange Act Release No. 88,827, 85 Fed. Reg. 28,702 (May 13, 2020).
11. See Gabriel Rauterberg, Innovation in the Stock Market and Alternative Trading Systems, FIN. MRKT. INFRASTRUCTURES: L. & REGUL. (Jens-Hinrich Binder & Paolo Saguato eds.,
forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5–6, 12 n.86) (on file with author) (“[A]ll currently operating
ATSs include no quotations in the public quotation stream.” (citation omitted)).
12. I have argued that exchanges have strong incentives to regulate listed company disclosure and broker conduct of business in the absence of a government regulator. See generally Paul G.
Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997). Given the current system, in
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and brokers, however, the distinction serves no useful purpose and should be
abolished.
The paper is structured as follows. Part II describes the path by which we
arrived at the current system of equity market structure regulation, arguing that
it reflects problems and intellectual trends that are in some cases no longer relevant. Part III discusses ways in which Regulation NMS does and indeed must
fall short of its goal of providing the benefits of consolidated and competing
markets. Part IV outlines an alternative set of regulatory principles and describes first steps the SEC could take to implement them. Part V concludes.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE REGULATION
The SEC has long disclaimed a desire to determine the way in which exchanges organize trading or the fees they charge for their services. 13 In a long
series of incremental steps, however, it has done both. This Part describes the
evolution of the SEC’s market structure role, focusing on the specific problems
and complaints that prompted regulatory action and the intellectual trends that
shaped it.
A. From the New Deal to the Securities Acts Amendments
The Securities Exchange Act as originally enacted regulated market structure indirectly through its commands to exchanges to prevent fraud, manipulation, and excessive leverage. 14 The exchanges themselves, not the SEC, were
expected to regulate the business conduct of their member brokers. 15 The original statute required that exchanges, but not their member broker-dealers, register with the SEC. 16 By registering, an exchange becomes a self-regulatory organization (SRO), a term added to the statute in 1975. 17 The exchange’s rules
which the SEC comprehensively regulates both areas, the exchanges’ regulatory role has become a
relic.
13. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. DOC.
NO. 92-64, at XXIII (1st Sess. 1971) (“We do not believe, however, that it is either feasible or desirable for the Commission or any other agency of the government to predetermine and require a
particular structure . . . .”); see also Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, Exchange Act Release No. 42,208, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,613, 70,619 (Dec. 17, 1999) (in requiring fair and
reasonable fees, Congress did not intend for SEC to become a ratemaking body).
14. These provisions, as amended, remain in the statute. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g (margin requirements), 78i (prohibition against manipulation), 78j(b) (general antifraud provision) (2018).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (2018).
16. The exchange registration requirement, as amended, appears at 15 U.S.C. § 78e. Congress added in 1936 a requirement for brokers and dealers operating in over-the-counter markets to
register. See Act of May 27, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-621, § 3, 49 Stat. 1377 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78o). The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 extended the registration requirement
to broker-dealers whose business was limited to on-exchange activity. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 11, 89 Stat. 121.
17. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 3(6), 89 Stat. 98 (adding
new 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26)).
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govern the mechanics of trading, its fees, the conduct of its members, and the
corporate governance of its listed companies. An SRO must submit proposed
rule changes for public comment and SEC approval. 18
Section 11 of the Act, however, gave the SEC direct influence over some
aspects of the market structure. 19 Subsection (a) authorized it to regulate principal trading by exchange members, including specialists. 20 Subsection (b) directed it to provide, by rule, that a specialist may trade for its own account only
to the extent necessary to maintain a fair and orderly market. 21 Finally, subsection (e) directed it to study the feasibility of the “complete segregation of the
functions of dealer and broker.” 22
These provisions stem from the 73rd Congress’s understanding of financial
markets. Economists would not develop the main building blocks of financial
economics—portfolio theory, informational efficiency, and asset pricing—until
decades later. 23 While traders of the 1930s could rely on experience and observation to value assets, Congress relied on a set of sometimes mistaken intuitions
that we can observe in the legislative history of the Exchange Act.
These intuitions included the belief that dealers who trade for their own account introduce excess volatility into prices. 24 This is because public investors
were understood to be highly susceptible to chasing price trends. Legislators
therefore understood financial professionals’ trading as motivated primarily by
the desire to ignite momentum and profit from it. 25 It followed that principal
trading by broker-dealers did not serve the interests of ordinary investors. 26
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b). Certain rule changes, including those relating to fees, are effective
upon filing with the SEC. § 78s(b)(3)(A).
19. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 11, 48 Stat. 891–892.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Key contributions include Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952),
Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 (1965), and William F.
Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN.
425 (1964), respectively.
24. The importance of active, constant trading can readily be exaggerated. A relatively stable
market over a period is of much greater importance to investors than a fictitiously stable market that
involves no more than one eighth of a point spread between sales but results in wide fluctuations
over days or weeks. See H.R. REP NO. 73-1383, at 14 (1934).
25. See STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 29 (1934) (claiming a floor trader’s “policy is to follow the
trend whether up or down, and his trading greatly accelerates the trend and accentuates market fluctuations.”); see also Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings before the House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee: Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73rd Cong. 124 (1934) (statement of
Thomas Corcoran) (asserting that floor traders “follow the market the way sea birds follow a ship,
following the trend . . . .”).
26. Roosevelt’s advisor Thomas Corcoran asserted:
The only interest the public has in a stock exchange is that it should be a place where the outside public can buy and sell its stocks. There is no public interest to be served by giving an inside seat to a small group of men who are trading for their own account.
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Ultimately, however, Congress did not take it upon itself to design an optimal market structure. An early provision in the bill that became the Exchange
Act, which would have barred stock exchange members from trading for their
own account, was replaced by Section 11(e), which directed the SEC to consider doing so by rule after conducting a study. 27
In the event, the SEC’s Segregation Report under Section 11(e) concluded
that it was too risky to separate the broker and dealer functions in one legislative or regulatory step. 28 Instead, it took a series of modest steps that included
barring a specialist from trading for its own account except to the extent necessary to maintain an orderly market, as Section 11(b) of the statute directed. 29
The statute also reflected a widespread contemporary belief in the efficacy
of expert management of complex economic processes. The early New Deal
reforms valued regimentation over competition. This was most visible in the
National Industrial Recovery Act’s wage and price setting and codes of fair
conduct. 30 The same thinking shaped the securities laws. The Securities Act of
1933 codified a set of best practices in underwriting, making them mandatory
for all public offerings. 31 The Exchange Act codified the New York Stock Exchange’s disclosure requirements, making them mandatory for all exchanges. 32
By the time Congress revisited market structure, confidence in the effectiveness
of expert administration had ebbed.

JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 86 (3rd ed. 2003). The Senate’s report
complained that own-account trades were not identified as such on the ticker tape, with the result
that “[a] volume of trading which might readily have been considered to reflect a widespread public
participation . . . represented . . . the activities of members themselves.” STOCK EXCHANGE
PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 20.
27. See H.R. 7855, 73rd Cong. § 10 (Feb. 10, 1934) (making it unlawful for any member of
a securities exchange acting as broker to act as a dealer of any security).
28. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF
THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER at 101–102, 109 (1936)
[hereinafter SEGREGATION REPORT] (advising an “evolutionary” approach).
29. See id. at 63.
30. See National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, §§ 3(a), 4(b), 48 Stat. 195,
196–197 (1933) (“Upon the application to the President by one or more trade or industrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code or codes of fair competition for the trade or industry . . . .”). The Supreme Court subsequently invalidated a code of fair competition for the poultry industry and in doing so found the NIRA unconstitutional. See generally A.L.A Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
31. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 20–26 (2001) (concluding that the Securities Act made mandatory the practices of the toptier investment banks).
32. See PAUL G. MAHONEY, WASTING A CRISIS: WHY SECURITIES REGULATION FAILS 80–
81 (2015) (with Jianping Mei) (“[T]he SEC borrowed heavily from the NYSE’s own disclosure
rules to create a mandatory disclosure system.”).
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B. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 and the birth of the NMS
Congress’s next significant foray into market structure came with the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975. 33 The statute responded to the paperwork crisis of the late 1960s, in which increased trading volumes overwhelmed the
NYSE’s paper-based trade reconciliation and settlement systems. 34 Large brokerage houses reacted by transitioning to computer-based back-office processing. Many smaller firms, along with a few large ones that did not manage
the transition effectively, either failed or were acquired. 35
Noticing that the increased trading volumes reflected the growing participation of institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension plans, and insurance
companies in the equity markets, and maintaining a residual fear that trading by
professional investors is inherently destabilizing, Congress directed the SEC to
study the influence of institutional investors on the securities markets. 36 In
March 1971, the SEC delivered its 3,000-page report and 2,000 pages of supplemental information, known as the Institutional Investor Study. 37
Among other things, the study concluded that institutions struggled to find
liquidity in sufficient depth for their trading needs. 38 While the NYSE specialist system was adequate for the needs of retail investors, it was not well-adapted
for trades of block size. These required a degree of negotiation before exposure
to the rest of the market.
Accordingly, NYSE members developed the practice of negotiating “upstairs,” or off the exchange floor, with institutional investors who desired to buy
or sell blocks of listed shares. A dealer could agree to take the opposite side of
the trade at a negotiated price. The deal would then be taken to the specialist,
who could substitute orders on his book for part of the block trade. 39 In this
way, institutions could negotiate with dealers off the floor without bypassing
public orders at better prices.
The Institutional Investor Study discussed the block trading market in detail. 40 Oddly, it did not consider the effect of the specialist’s negative obligation
in Section 11(b). An SEC staff interpretation from 1937 held that each individ33. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97.
34. See MARSHALL BLUME ET AL., REVOLUTION ON WALL STREET: THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 116–27 (1993).
35. See Wyatt Wells, Certificates and Computers: The Remaking of Wall Street, 1967 to
1971, 74 BUS. HIST. REV. 193, 232 (2000).
36. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-438, 82 Stat. 453 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(e)).
37. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT,
H.R. DOC. NO. 92-64 (1st Sess. 1971).
38. See id. at 95 (“[T]he growing importance of institutional trading has put added strains on
these markets . . . [because of] the relatively large transactions preferred by institutional investors.”).
39. See Hans R. Stoll, The Stock Exchange Specialist System: An Economic Analysis, in
MONOGRAPH SERIES IN FIN. & ECON. 1, 15 (Salomon Bros. Ctr. for Study Fin. Insts., 1985).
40. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. DOC.
NO. 92-64, at 1537–828 (1st Sess. 1971).
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ual trade by the specialist must be necessary to maintain a fair and orderly market. 41 As a consequence, a specialist could not agree to buy a block of shares
and then gradually sell it into the market—the latter trades would not be “necessary.”
This is not to say that the ordinary trading mechanism at the NYSE could
easily have accommodated block trades absent Section 11(b) and the staff interpretation. There would have been substantial issues to resolve, including how
the specialist could assure the best execution of all orders left with him if some
were non-discretionary orders from retail customers and others were discretionary orders from institutions. A possible solution—giving institutions direct access to the specialist post on the same terms as floor traders—would have evaded and possibly destroyed the fixed commission system.
The negative obligation nevertheless sidelined the specialist in the block
trading process. Block positioners, or dealers who assembled and disposed of
blocks of shares on behalf of institutional investors, traded on the NYSE, on regional exchanges, and in the “third market,” meaning dealers who were not
NYSE members but traded listed stocks over the counter. The SEC identified
the resulting fragmentation of trading in listed securities as a problem to be addressed. 42 The SEC thought a “central market system” that could permit all potential buyers and sellers to interact with one another would better serve investors. 43
The system of fixed commissions on the NYSE, however, posed a barrier to
a central market. The desire to avoid those commissions led investors to route
orders to other markets, producing fragmentation. The NYSE attempted to
counter this through rules that limited its members’ ability to trade listed stocks
off the exchange. 44 The NYSE’s rules had barred members from trading listed
stocks on regional exchanges until 1941, when the SEC required it to relax the
rule. 45 At the time of the 1975 amendments, NYSE Rule 394 restricted exchange members from trading directly with third market dealers. 46
Although disavowing an intent to impose a market structure of the SEC’s
devising, the Institutional Investor Study noted with approval that developments
in communications and data processing made it feasible to link the primary and
regional exchanges together without merging them into a single entity. 47 The

41. See generally Exchange Act Release No. 1117, 1937 SEC Lexis 357 (Mar. 30, 1937).
42. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. DOC.
NO. 92-64, at XXIV (1st Sess. 1971) (“[T]here has been no market which was strong enough and
liquid enough to serve as a major central market.”).
43. See id. (“A major goal and ideal . . . has been the creation of a strong central market system . . . in which all buying and selling interest . . . could participate . . . .”).
44. See id. at XXII.
45. See The Rules of the New York Stock Exch., 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941).
46. See Note, NYSE Rules and the Antitrust Laws—Rule 394—Necessary Restriction or Illegal Refusal to Deal?, 45 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 812, 828 (1971).
47. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. DOC.
NO. 92-64, at XXIII (1st Sess. 1971) (“We believe that because of modern communication and data
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SEC identified exchange restrictions on trading listed stocks off-exchange as a
significant impediment to such links.
Five months after the SEC published the Institutional Investor Study, the
NYSE released a report that it had commissioned from the recently retired chair
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and former NYSE
chair, William McChesney Martin, Jr. 48 The Martin Report also recommended
a form of centralized market. It proposed that each exchange become the exclusive venue for trading its listed stocks. It also, however, proposed to maintain
fixed commissions and the panoply of incidental rules that kept institutional investors from obtaining direct access to the market.
This effort to preserve the NYSE’s fixed commission structure doomed the
Martin Report to condemnation as an anticompetitive rearguard action. 49 Ignoring its recommendations, the SEC moved toward a system of separate but
linked markets and received explicit instruction from Congress to pursue a “national market system” (NMS) in the 1975 amendments. 50
Those amendments added a new emphasis on decentralization and competition to the Exchange Act. By the mid-1970s, the intellectual pendulum had
swung away from faith in one size fits all regulation. In 1971, George Stigler
published The Theory of Economic Regulation, providing a theoretical account
of the competitive harms that can result from the combined self-interest of regulators and the regulated. 51 Politicians from both major parties concluded that
many regulated industries were insufficiently competitive, to the detriment of
consumers. 52 This intellectual and political shift resulted in the easing of regulatory price and entry restrictions, most prominently in the airline, trucking, and
telecommunications industries. 53
The Securities Acts Amendments reflected this change in attitude. While
the Exchange Act as originally enacted did not contain a single reference to
“competition,” the word appears 23 times in the 1975 amendments, including
the preamble’s declaration of a legislative desire “to remove barriers to competition” in the Exchange Act. 54 Most notably, the statute ordered the SEC to end

processing facilities it is possible to preserve geographically separated trading markets while at the
same time tying them together on a national basis.”).
48. See generally WILLIAM MCCHESNEY MARTIN, JR., THE SECURITIES MARKET (1971).
49. See e.g., Donald E. Farrar, The Martin Report: Wall Street’s Proposed “Great Leap
Backward”, 27 FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sep–Oct 1971, at 14, 16 (1971).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(2) (2018) (“The Commission is directed . . . to use its authority . . .
to facilitate the establishment of a national market system for securities . . . .”).
51. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (“A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”).
52. See Reuel Schiller, The Ideological Origins of Deregulation, THE REGUL. REV. (Mar. 18,
2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/03/18/schiller-ideological-origins-deregulation/.
53. See MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 1 (1985).
54. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94–29, 89 Stat. 97.
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fixed commissions on the NYSE, a process already underway at the time of enactment. 55
A second consequential intellectual development was the emergence of a
theory of market microstructure (although not yet under that name). 56 From the
enactment of the Exchange Act until the mid-1960s, the central policy debate
was whether market intermediaries exaggerate or retard price trends. The
SEC’s 1963 Special Study of the Securities Markets analyzed data to determine
whether specialists and floor traders exercised a “stabilizing” influence by trading in the opposite direction of price movements, or the reverse. 57 In that respect, the Special Study did not represent a conceptual advance from the SEC’s
Segregation Report of 1936, which had similarly focused on whether specialists
and floor traders followed or leaned against price trends. 58
In response to the Special Study, Stigler provided a different and novel
analysis of the role of specialists and floor traders. 59 He conceived of investors
as having individual demand schedules for stocks. Rather than submitting these
all at once to an auctioneer to determine a market-clearing price, individual investors submit bids and offers asynchronously and in random sequence to the
central market. Each order rests there until it either finds a match or expires. In
this informal model, a liquidity supplier can profit by selling to buyers whose
bids are above the market-clearing price and vice versa. These liquidity suppliers make investors better off by increasing the probability of transacting and reducing the delay between orders and executions.
The criterion of market efficiency in such a setting is not the stability of
prices but the cost of transacting as measured by the bid-ask spread. 60 Harold
Demsetz formalized the analysis, modeling the bid-ask spread as the price of
“immediacy,” or the ability to convert securities to cash or vice versa with minimal delay. 61 The market microstructure literature developed from this basic
insight.
The initial focus of that literature was to identify the determinants of the
bid-ask spread quoted by a given market maker. 62 An early paper noted that

55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(1) (2018).
56. As far as I am aware, the term was first used by Mark B. Garman, Market Microstructure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 257 (1976).
57. See U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES
MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 106–110, 213–18 (1st Sess. 1963).
58. See SEGREGATION REPORT, supra note 28, at 19–21, 35–37.
59. See George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117, 124–
33 (1964).
60. Id. at 129 (“In this regime the cost of transactions (half the bid-ask spread plus commissions) will be the complete inverse measure of the efficiency of the markets.”).
61. See Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33, 35–37 (1968).
62. Id. at 40–55; see also Seha M. Tinic, The Economics of Liquidity Services, 86 Q.J. ECON.
79, 79–80 (1972). See generally Kalman J. Cohen et al., Market Makers and the Market Spread: A
Review of Recent Literature, 14 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 813, 819 (1979) (noting literature’s
focus on the individual dealer/specialist bid-ask spreads).
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market makers suffer trading losses to investors who possess information not
yet reflected in prices. 63 The market maker must set a spread sufficient to cover
these adverse selection costs. Economists also identified various factors affecting the market maker’s inventory management costs, including trading volume
and volatility. 64
This emphasis on cost at the level of the individual market maker led scholars to ask whether economies of scale made the position of liquidity provider—
in effect, the exchange specialist—a natural monopoly. 65 Later scholars would
note that this focus was incomplete because it ignored the fact that public investors who submit limit orders compete with the exchange specialist and floor
traders to supply liquidity and capture the spread. 66 That insight was not yet
formalized at the time of the 1975 amendments and the SEC’s first steps toward
implementation.
Commentators accordingly viewed the NYSE’s auction market as inferior
to Nasdaq’s competitive dealer market. Everything about the NYSE—fixed
commissions, restrictions on off-exchange trading, the ban on institutional
membership, the single specialist barred from doing business directly with anyone other than exchange members—looked monopolistic to critics. Seymour
Smidt, an economist who served as an associate director of the Institutional Investor Study, and Morris Mendelson, an economist who wrote a detailed blueprint for a centralized market, both took it as obvious that an optimal market
would look more like the Nasdaq dealer market than the NYSE auction market. 67
The SEC was eager to create competition for the NYSE specialist and focused on intermarket linkages as the means. 68 Beginning in 1971, the SEC
pressured the exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers

63. See Walter Bagehot (pseudonym for Jack L. Treynor), The Only Game in Town, 27 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 12, 13 (1971) (“The market maker always loses” to “transactors possessing special
information”; therefore “his gains from liquidity-motivated transactors must exceed his losses to
information-motivated transactors.”). The dynamic interaction of information traders and market
makers was formalized by Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53
ECONOMETRICA 1315 (1985).
64. See Tinic, supra note 62, at 80.
65. Compare Demsetz, supra note 61, at 42 (“scale economies with respect to the transactions of a particular trader suggest natural monopoly”), with Seymour Smidt, Which Road to an Efficient Stock Market: Free Competition or Regulated Monopoly?, 27 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 18, 64
(1971) (“There is no empirical evidence to support the proposition that [market making] is, in fact, a
natural monopoly.”).
66. See Cohen et al., supra note 62, at 814 (“[I]nadequate attention has been given to the fact
that, via their limit orders, ‘ordinary’ traders also supply immediacy”).
67. See Smidt, supra note 65, at 65–66; see also Morris Mendelson, From Automated
Quotes to Automated Trading: Restructuring the Stock Market in the U.S. 34–35, N.Y.U.
GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS. ADMIN. INST. OF FIN. BULL. NOS. 80–82, at 34–35 (1972).
68. See generally Paul G. Mahoney & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The Regulation of Trading
Markets, in Merritt B. Fox et al., eds., Securities Market Issues for the 21st Century 221, 234–236
(Merritt B. Fox et al. eds., 2018).
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(NASD) to create a consolidated tape to report the prices and quantities of all
transactions in listed securities. 69 The SEC also proposed a consolidated quotation system to display publicly the best bids and offers on each exchange and
from each dealer in listed stocks. The NYSE, which viewed the specialist’s
book as proprietary, strongly resisted the latter project. 70
The 1975 amendments, however, removed any doubt about the SEC’s authority to require “linking of all markets . . . through communication and data
processing facilities.” 71 The SEC required the exchanges and the NASD to create a consolidated quotation system. 72 The market centers were to report lastsale and quotation data to a “securities information processor” (SIP), which
would then sell the information to third parties on terms that the Exchange Act
requires to be “fair and reasonable.” 73
The NYSE and American Stock Exchange created a jointly owned SIP to
disseminate quotations in listed securities and options while Nasdaq registered
as a SIP for Nasdaq-traded and other over-the-counter securities. 74 The relevant
market centers formed joint committees, or “Plans,” to determine the fees they
would charge for market data and how to allocate the resulting revenue among
the participating markets. As a practical matter, then, the trading markets collectively negotiated the price of access to quotations with the professional investment community.
Finally, at the SEC’s urging, the exchanges and the NASD created order
routing linkages, known as the Intermarket Trading System (ITS). The ITS was
first implemented as an experiment but in 1983 gained SEC approval to operate
indefinitely. 75 It consisted of a messaging system through which a broker on
the floor of one exchange could transmit an order to another participating market. In connection with the ITS, the exchanges adopted rules limiting the ability
of a member broker to initiate a “trade through,” meaning a trade at a price inferior to that displayed by another ITS market. 76
The ITS required exchanges to act against their self-interest. An exchange
desires to execute an order for which it is the initial point of entry. No exchange, therefore, had an incentive to maintain the ITS at the leading edge of

69. See Rule 17a-15, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-15 (1973) (amended and replaced by Rule 601 of
Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. § 242.601 (2020)).
70. See Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, supra note 13, at 70,620 (describing history of consolidated quotation system).
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(D) (2018).
72. See Display of Transaction Reports, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,369, 12,405–07 (1980) (codified at
17 C.F.R. 240.11Ac1-2) (amended and replaced by Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. §
242.602 (2020)).
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(c)(1)(C) (2018).
74. See Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, supra note 13, at 70,616,
n.18.
75. See Am. Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 19,456, 48 Fed. Reg. 4,938,
4,938–39 (1983).
76. See id. at 4,939.
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information technology. 77 Nor did the exchanges have incentives to enforce
trade-through protections, a task they left to the broker representing an order
that was traded through. 78
The SEC’s initial plan had been more disruptive still to existing market
models. Announcing its desire for an ITS in 1978, the SEC stated that its ultimate goal was to require the exchanges to create a “central limit order file” and
to recognize time as well as price priority for all public limit orders in the file. 79
In that system, a broker would be barred from executing an order outside the
central file if an order at the same or a better price was available in the file. If
the file contained multiple orders at the best price, the one first in time would be
first to execute. However, the exchanges strongly opposed the central file on
the grounds that it would reduce dealers’ incentives to make markets and ultimately displace the exchanges’ trading floors. The SEC backed down. 80
A plausible reading of the 1975 amendments is that Congress wanted the
SEC to sweep aside all of the NYSE’s anti-competitive rules, not just fixed
commissions, then permit competition to determine the way in which price and
quotation information would reach brokers and how those brokers would seek
the best execution for their customers. 81 Instead, the SEC chose to centralize
not just post-trade price and volume data, but also pre-trade quotation data, and
to force exchanges to route trades to their competitors. The SEC apparently
took the NYSE’s anticompetitive practices as empirical proof that competition
among traders and trading venues cannot produce efficient market structures
without direct regulatory intervention. The conclusion was hasty for two reasons.
At the time of the 1975 amendments, the stock exchanges’ role as SROs
bearing statutory obligations complicated the application of normal antitrust
principles to anti-competitive exchange policies. 82 The Seventh Circuit had re-

77. See Hans R. Stoll, Market Fragmentation, 57 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 16, 16 (2001) (“The ITS
. . . has not kept pace with technology”).
78. See Mahoney & Rauterberg, supra note 68, at 236.
79. See Development of National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 14,416, 43
Fed. Reg. 4,353, 4,359 (1978).
80. See Development of a National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 15,671, 44
Fed. Reg. 20,360, 20,362 (1979) (“[T]he Commission recognizes the possibility that introduction of
a system based upon the absolute time priority concept could have a radical and potentially disruptive impact on the trading process . . . . Therefore, industry and Commission efforts should be concentrated on the achievement of nation-wide protection for all public limit orders based on the principle of price priority.”).
81. See Gallagher, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that, under 1975 Amendments, “‘competitive
forces’ were supposed to drive market development” (citation omitted)); see also Jonathan R.
Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System, 1985
U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 323–24 (1985) (“[T]he proper process seems to be to eliminate the restrictions
on market participation, then to allow the market to dictate the evolution of the appropriate communications systems”).
82. See Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 360–61 (1963) (although self-regulatory status of
exchanges does not convey a blanket exemption from the antitrust laws, actions “which fall within
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cently held that the fixed commission rule was an exercise of the self-regulatory
function and accordingly outside the scope of the antitrust laws. 83 Just weeks
after the 1975 amendments were enacted, the Supreme Court concluded that the
Exchange Act pre-empted the antitrust laws with respect to stock exchange
commission rates. 84 Absent the statutory scheme that Congress created and the
SEC administered, the NYSE’s rules would have been subject to antitrust scrutiny and the fixed commission rule likely invalidated long before 1975.
Moreover, at the time of the 1975 amendments, it had only recently become
technologically feasible for electronic order entry, routing, and execution to replace face-to-face or telephonic communication. The Institutional Investor
Study observed that “[u]ntil comparatively recently there were serious technological limitations on creating a system where all interests of investors could be
represented in a central market.” 85 But it went on to argue that centralizing
trading on a single market produces “a certain amount of monopoly power, particularly with respect to the dealer function.” 86 The SEC therefore concluded
that investors and exchanges would not take full advantage of new technologies
without prodding.
C. From the 1975 Amendments to Regulation NMS
In the decade after the 1975 amendments, economists gained a more detailed appreciation for the role that limit orders play in a specialist market and
accordingly came to see the distinction between dealer and auction markets in a
different light. 87 In theory, limit orders provide competition to the specialist,
meaning that the specialist cannot unilaterally determine the market bid-ask
spread for a listed stock. 88 Empirically, as of the mid-1970s, about 50% of
traded volume on the NYSE involved a limit order on the specialist’s book,
compared to about 25% of traded volume in which the specialist took one side
of the trade as principal. 89
Were the Nasdaq dealer market more competitive than the NYSE auction
market, one would have expected bid-ask spreads to be smaller on Nasdaq for

the scope and purposes of the Securities Exchange Act may be regarded as justified” for antitrust
purposes).
83. See Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954
(1967).
84. See Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 691 (1975).
85. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO.
92-64, at XXIV (1st Sess. 1971).
86. Id.
87. See generally Robert C. Klemkosky & Robert M. Conroy, Competition and the Cost of
Liquidity to Investors, 37 J. ECON. & BUS. 183, 184 (1985) (distinguishing external competition
from other dealers and internal competition from limit orders).
88. See Kalman J. Cohen et al., Transaction Costs, Order Placement Strategy, and Existence
of the Bid-Ask Spread, 89 J. POL. ECON. 287, 297 (1981).
89. See Stoll, supra note 39, at 14–15.
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stocks of similar size and trading volume. However, studies consistently found
lower average quoted spreads on the NYSE. 90 Although there are many possible explanations, including differential inventory or information costs, the empirical results focused further attention on the role that limit orders play in the
NYSE auction market.
Public traders who submit limit orders operate at a disadvantage relative to
NYSE specialists or Nasdaq market makers. Professional dealers intensely
monitor the market in their assigned stocks and can adjust their quotations rapidly and frequently. By contrast, public traders have other demands on their
time and can adjust their prices only episodically. Public investors who send
limit orders to the specialist through their brokers, therefore, write options to the
rest of the market. 91 They do so in the belief that the expected gains from buying or selling at superior prices exceed the implicit option premium. The rest of
the market meanwhile benefits from the option in the form of lower average
spreads.
This insight, in turn, produces a slightly different outlook on the competing
dealer model. Nasdaq was designed as a pure dealer market. Every customer
trade was with a market maker at its bid or ask price. In principle, a broker
could leave a limit order with a market maker, but unlike the NYSE specialist,
the Nasdaq market maker had no obligation to give it priority over its own quotations or expose it to the rest of the market. Instead, the market maker could
trade against the order as principal if and when it found it in its interests to do
so. The bid-ask spread, therefore, was determined by competition among dealers in which public limit orders did not play a material role.
Having concluded that the NYSE auction model was more competitive than
it appeared at first glance, economists soon concluded that the competing dealer
model might be less competitive than it appeared – at least as realized on
Nasdaq in the early 1990s. Although the minimum tick size on Nasdaq was
one-eighth of a dollar, William Christie and Paul Schultz demonstrated that
dealers largely avoided quotes at odd eighths. 92 Thus the quoted spread for
many stocks was at least twenty-five cents. The Christie and Schultz paper
raised the possibility that dealers were colluding to maintain a wider spread.
The SEC responded to the resulting outcry by adopting the so-called “order
handling rules” in 1996. 93 Among other things, the order handling rules required Nasdaq market makers and exchange specialists to display customer limit orders that improved either the price or size of the dealer’s own quote. After

90. See Ananth Madhavan, Market Microstructure: A Survey, 3 J. FIN. MKTS. 205, 231
(2000).
91. See generally Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Galai, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask
Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457 (1983).
92. See William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid
Odd-Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1813, 1838 (1994).
93. See Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. Reg.
48,290 (Sept. 12, 1996). The order handling rules are now codified at 17 C.F.R. § 242.604 (2020).
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the rule’s implementation in 1997, the Nasdaq market incorporated auction features, just as the ITS introduced competing-quotation features to the auction
markets. The two models would soon converge.
By the close of the 20th century, the SEC had required the regulated exchanges to create a consolidated trade reporting system, a consolidated quotation system, and a set of intermarket communication links enabling an exchange
receiving an order to route it to one displaying a superior price. There was nevertheless reason to question whether these structural changes had created robust
competition among venues and market makers. Two facts in particular stood
out.
The NYSE remained the dominant market for its listed stocks, accounting
for roughly 90% of on-exchange trading volume and 80% of total trading volume in its listed stocks. 94 The SEC accordingly pressured the NYSE to eliminate Rule 390, the successor to Rule 394, which continued to limit members’
ability to trade listed securities as principal off the exchange floor. The NYSE
repealed the rule in 2000. 95
Meanwhile, despite a change in the minimum tick size from one-eighth to
one-sixteenth on Nasdaq, the NYSE’s quoted and realized spreads remained
smaller than those on Nasdaq. 96 Hendrik Bessembinder, who documented the
fact, attributed it to the widespread practice of “preferencing” Nasdaq order
flow. 97 In a preferencing arrangement, a broker agrees to route orders to a particular market maker, with the latter agreeing to execute at the best quote even if
it was not currently displaying the best quote. 98 Preferencing weakens market
makers’ incentives to quote aggressively because they can capture order flow
without publicly displaying the best price.
These indicia of less-than-perfect competition coexisted with indicia of
market fragmentation. The order handling rules led to a growing volume of
trading in Nasdaq stocks through ATSs. 99 At that time, ATSs traded primarily
in Nasdaq stocks, although they began to trade actively in NYSE stocks after
the repeal of Rule 390. An ATS that chose to display its best quotes publicly,
known as an “electronic communications network” (ECN), could require that
Nasdaq incorporate those quotes into the consolidated quotation system. 100

94. See Treasury Press Release, supra note 7, at 53 fig.6 (showing the share of on-exchange
volume); see also Angel, Harris & Spatt, supra note 2, at 18–19 (showing the share of total trading
volume).
95. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Rescind Exchange Rule 390, Exchange
Act Release 42,758, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,175, 30,176 (May 10, 2000).
96. See Hendrik Bessembinder, Trade Execution Costs on Nasdaq and the NYSE: A PostReform Comparison, 34 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 387, 388 (1999).
97. Id. at 389–90.
98. See Paul E. Godek, Why Nasdaq Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes, 41 J. FIN.
ECON. 465, 466–67 (1996).
99. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Rescind Rule 390; Exchange Act Release No. 42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577, 10,580 (Feb. 28, 2000).
100. See 17 C.F.R. §242.600(b)(24) (2020) (defining “electronic communications network”).
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Other ATSs, known as “dark pools,” chose not to display quotations. 101 Although some ATSs initially decided to operate as ECNs, at present all ATS operate as dark pools. 102
In addition, brokers route retail orders to dealers who execute the trades
from their own inventory outside the organized markets, a practice known as
“internalization.” Because retail customers’ orders are considered safe (that is,
not informed), dealers are eager to execute them and earn the spread—so much
so that they pay brokers to route orders to them, a practice known as payment
for order flow. 103
Meanwhile, the market microstructure literature debated the relative merits
of consolidating order flow onto a single venue versus allowing multiple venues
to compete with one another. Lawrence Glosten demonstrated the theoretical
appeal of a consolidated limit order book (CLOB) open to all traders, displaying
the price and size of all limit orders, and running an automated continuous auction. 104 An idealized CLOB, he argued, would produce a sufficiently small bidask spread that no exchange or dealer would have an incentive to compete with
it. Moreover, the CLOB would produce as much liquidity as feasible given the
existence of an information asymmetry among traders.
The challenge for an open CLOB is practical: how would its services be
priced? An open CLOB would be in essence a public utility. If the owner could
not make a profit, no one would have an incentive to build it. On the other
hand, if the CLOB did indeed centralize all trading, the owner could charge a
monopoly price for market access and/or data. 105 Thus, when a group led by
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley proposed that the SEC require a CLOB and offered to build and operate it, other industry participants
shouted down the proposal as anticompetitive. 106
Other academics argued in favor of competition among trading venues over
consolidation on a single venue. Larry Harris noted that the needs of large and
small traders differ and market fragmentation is one response. 107 The develop-

101. See Mahoney & Rauterberg, supra note 68, at 242–43.
102. See Rauterberg, supra note 11 (manuscript at 6).
103. See Allen Ferrell, A Proposal for Solving the Payment for Order Flow Problem, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2001).
104. See generally Lawrence R. Glosten, Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable?, 49 J. FIN. 1127 (1994).
105. See Craig Pirrong, Securities Market Macrostructure: Property Rights and the Efficiency
of Securities Trading, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 385, 386 (2002) (suggesting that, while centralizing
trading improves welfare under open access, the operator of the central market has an incentive to
limit access to maximize profit).
106. See Michael Schroeder, Stock-Trading Powerhouses Change Tune on Overhaul, WALL
ST. J. (June 2, 2000), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB959892058978104469.
107. See Lawrence E. Harris, Consolidation, Fragmentation, Segmentation, and Regulation,
in GLOBAL EQUITY MARKETS: TECHNOLOGICAL, COMPETITIVE, AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES
269, 275–77 (Robert A. Schwartz ed., 1995).
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ing literature on network effects suggested that the loss of consumer surplus
from monopoly may outweigh network efficiencies. 108
Still others contended that efficient market structures could arise from the
decentralized decisions of market participants without regulatory guidance.
Hans Stoll argued that the ITS was ill-conceived. The SEC need not require exchanges to create intermarket linkages so long as brokers seek the best execution on behalf of their customers and the exchanges publicize their best bids and
offers. 109 Under those conditions, brokers will create their own links to the
competing markets and use them to route orders to the market offering the best
price. Unlike exchanges, which do not benefit individually from intermarket
linkages, brokers would have an incentive to make theirs as quick and effective
as possible.
Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson proposed a different form of decentralized decision making about market structure. 110 They argued that publicly
traded companies should be able to select the markets in which their securities
will trade. Because there is a positive association between liquidity and market
value, issuers have an incentive to select the trading venue(s) that maximize the
stock’s liquidity and thereby its share price. 111 Issuers’ choices could be the
mechanism driving exchanges to provide efficient trading platforms. Issuers
might choose to centralize all trading on a single venue, to disperse trading
among as many platforms as possible, or something in between, depending on
the liquidity consequences.
The SEC, however, concluded that its preferred system of separate but
linked markets, with some revisions, could provide the best of both worlds—
competition among market venues and interaction of all customer orders. In
Regulation NMS, adopted in 2005 and implemented in phases during 2006, it
addressed what it viewed as the deficiencies in the ITS.
In particular, Regulation NMS replaced existing exchange rules governing
trade-throughs and market access with SEC-determined rules binding on the exchanges. Its “order protection rule” (OPR) requires market centers (including
Nasdaq and over-the-counter market-makers, which were not previously subject
to the exchange trade-through rules) to design policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent trade-throughs of “protected quotations.” 112 Only quotations available for automatic and immediate execution are protected. 113 Under
108. See Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 673,
683 (1996).
109. See Stoll, supra note 77, at 19.
110. See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Trading
Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411, 1415–16 (1996).
111. On the association between liquidity and market value, see Yakov Amihud and Haim
Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 246–47 (1986).
112. See Order Protection Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(a)(1) (2020).
113. A “protected quotation” includes a “protected bid or protected offer”, NMS Security
Designation and Definitions, 17 C.F.R. § 600(b)(62) (2020). The latter terms are limited to “automated quotations.” See id. § 242.600(b)(61)(iii). An “automated quotation” is one displayed by a
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the so-called “Access Rule,” trading centers are required to provide nondiscriminatory execution access to those quotations and to charge no more than threetenths of a cent per share for such access. 114
The OPR and associated rule changes were controversial. Their adoption
prompted a lengthy dissent by two of the five commissioners, who argued that
the new regulations would have a “detrimental impact on competition and innovation.” 115 They predicted that the OPR would homogenize exchanges and fail
to encourage traders to display liquidity publicly. 116 As I discuss in the next
section, both predictions were accurate. 117
III. DRAWBACKS OF REGULATION NMS
This section discusses the drawbacks of the current structure in detail. Unfortunately, the multiplicity of trading venues has not produced innovation in
trading methods nor competitive pricing for market data. Instead, innovation
and competition have come in the form of complex access fee structures and
investments in communicating ever more rapidly from one venue to another,
neither of which is clearly socially beneficial.
An obvious counterargument is that the equity markets are functioning quite
well, particularly for the largest traded companies. There is always a danger
that changing the system would reduce market quality, a point I address at the
end of this section.
A. Regulation NMS and Market Fragmentation
As of July 2020, there are thirteen operating equity exchanges in the United
States. In 2000, by contrast, there were eight. Beginning in 2005, Nasdaq and
the NYSE acquired the other six of those, but have maintained them as separate
exchanges, in some cases operating under different access fee and rebate structures. 118 A new family of exchanges, BATS (now owned by CBOE and com-

trading center that “immediately and automatically” executes an incoming market order against that
quotation. See id. § 242.600(b)(4).
114. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.610(a) (2020) (nondiscriminatory access); see id. § 242.610(c) (fee
cap).
115. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,632 (June
29, 2005) (Comm’rs Cynthia A. Glassman and Paul S. Atkins, dissenting).
116. Id. at 37,640 (“the trade-through rule will restrict competitive forces and reduce markets
to the lowest common denominator”); see id. at 37,637 (noting that OPR will “provide more incentive to maintain liquidity in reserve, rather than to display it publicly”).
117. See also Gallagher, supra note 3, at 5 (“As Commissioners Atkins and Glassman predicted in 2005, Reg NMS has exacerbated market fragmentation and complexity while at the same
time blunting competition and innovation.”).
118. The former American stock exchange now operates as NYSE American. The former
Cincinnati Stock Exchange, subsequently renamed the National Stock Exchange, now operates as
NYSE National. The former Chicago Stock Exchange now operates as NYSE Chicago. The former
Pacific Stock Exchange was acquired by Archipelago Holdings, which now operate as NYSE Arca.
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prising four separate equity exchanges) was created in 2005. The Investors Exchange, or IEX, is a stand-alone exchange that began trading in 2016. Three
more equity exchanges are in the process of opening. One will be affiliated
with an existing family of registered equity options exchanges, the MIAX Exchange Group. Two additional stand-alone exchanges, the Long-Term Stock
Exchange, or LTSE, and the Members Exchange, or MEMX, have obtained
SEC registration.
As electronic trading has replaced manual trading, the cost of creating a
trading platform has fallen, making the market for exchanges contestable. 119
The cost of obtaining regulatory approval, however, remains substantial. 120
Creating a new exchange is also difficult because of a network externality.
Traders want to go where there are already other traders. Liquidity attracts liquidity, as the saying goes. Why would anyone connect and pay access and data fees to a new exchange that operates identically to existing exchanges and
has, at the outset, minimal trading?
The short answer is that Regulation NMS forces existing exchanges to connect to any newly registered exchange. The SIP must also gather its trade and
quotation data and share the revenues generated by the consolidated data feeds.
And although the OPR is addressed to trading centers, not brokers, institutional
brokers argue that they have no practical alternative but to connect (and pay
fees) to every registered exchange. 121 Finally, the major exchange groups have
an incentive to maintain any acquired exchange as a separate entity rather than
fold it into an existing exchange. As currently structured, each exchange gets a
vote in the Equity Data Plans that determine the amount and allocation of data
fees. 122 Regulation NMS is therefore part of the reason for the proliferation of
exchanges.

The former Boston and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges now operate as Nasdaq BX and Nasdaq
PHLX, respectively. The latter is an options exchange. Nasdaq also, however, operates a Nasdaq
PSX equity exchange. The SEC’s web page contains a list of registered exchanges. See SelfRegulatory Organization Rulemaking, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov
/rules/sro.shtml (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).
119. See Ian Domowitz & Benn Steil, Automation, Trading Costs, and the Structure of the
Trading Services Industry, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 33, 33
(Robert Litan and A.M. Sontomero eds., 1999); see also Albert J. Menkveld, High-Frequency Traders and Market Structure, 49 FIN. REV. 333, 334 (2014).
120. See Rauterberg, supra note 11 (manuscript at 19).
121. See Alexander Osipovich & Gunjan Banerji, As Stock Exchanges Multiply, Miami Wants
In on the Game, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2019, 8:02AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stockexchange-competition-heats-up-as-miax-eyes-launch-11551704521 (“[L]arge brokers and traders
. . . say they are effectively forced by Securities and Exchange Commission rules to connect to each
exchange”).
122. The SEC has ordered an amendment that will give each exchange family a single vote.
See Order Directing the Exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to Submit a
New National Market System Plan Regarding Consolidated Equity Market Data, Exchange Act Release No. 88,827, 85 Fed. Reg. 28,702, 28,729–30 (May 13, 2020).
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One might argue this is all to the good. More exchanges mean more competition. Unfortunately, the fragmentation of trading has not produced the degree of trading system innovation and reduction in trading costs that the SEC
expected. It has also increased the demand for high-speed communication between exchanges. The various SEC proposals mentioned in the Introduction
and described in more detail below demonstrate that the agency is not entirely
happy with its creation.
B. Regulation NMS Creates Questionable Incentives for Trading Centers and
Professional Traders
As U.S. exchanges shifted from manual to electronic order matching, liquidity provision shifted from specialists and traditional market makers to highfrequency trading firms (HFTs). 123 Although there is no universally accepted
definition of HFTs, a working definition might be firms that specialize in entering and canceling proprietary orders rapidly using automated processes.
HFTs can trade at microsecond speeds through colocation—placing the
hardware running their trading algorithms in close physical proximity to the
hardware running the exchanges’ matching engines—and through investing in
high-speed communications links between trading venues. Exchanges offer,
and HFTs subscribe to, high-speed proprietary data feeds that both reach traders
faster than the SIP’s data and include information that the exchanges do not
provide the SIP.
Stock traders have always been early adopters of new communications
technologies in the competition to get information first. 124 Informed traders
want to trade before others learn the same information or infer it from the pattern of orders or trades. Liquidity providers face a basic tradeoff between capturing the bid-ask spread and leaving themselves open to adverse selection and
inventory management risk. The faster they can revise their priced orders in
response to new information, the less susceptible they will be to these risks. To
the extent HFTs can minimize risk, they can quote tighter spreads, which benefits liquidity demanders. 125 We might think of that as a defensive use of the
HFTs’ speed advantage.

123. Cf. Vincent van Kervel & Albert J. Menkveld, High-Frequency Trading around Large
Institutional Orders, 74 J. FIN. 1091, 1091 (2019) (“Migration to electronic trading created a new
type of market participant: high-frequency traders (HFTs).”).
124. See Kenneth Garbade & William Silber, Technology, Communication and the Performance of Financial Markets: 1840-1975, 33 J. FIN. 819, 823 (1978) (domestic telegraph); see also
id. at 826–27 (transatlantic cable).
125. See Jonathan Brogaard et al., Trading Fast and Slow: Colocation and Liquidity, 28 REV.
FIN. STUD. 3407, 3408–09 (2015) (describing market-maker use of colocation services and resulting
improvements in effective spreads). See also Katya Malinova, Andreas Park & Ryan Riordan, Do
Retail Investors Suffer from High Frequency Traders? 4 (Working Paper, 2018)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2183806 (finding that Canadian regulatory fee change that reduced HFT
increased effective spreads for retail traders).
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There is also, however, an offensive use in which HFTs impose adverse selection losses on other traders. For example, when the price of an asset increases on Exchange A, if a given trader can obtain that information and act on it
more quickly than others, it can trade against quotations for the same asset that
are now stale (that is, do not reflect the new market conditions) on Exchanges
B, C, and D. This “latency arbitrage” offers significant profits. 126
HFT and latency arbitrage do not just exist in U.S. equity markets. However, there is some reason to believe that the U.S. regulatory system encourages
more than the socially optimal amount of investments in speed. The more venues there are trading the same assets, the more prizes there are to be won by
winning races from one to another as quoted prices change. The association between Regulation NMS and fragmentation, therefore, may also link Regulation
NMS to excessive investments in speed.
A separate issue arises from Regulation NMS’s definition of “protected
quotation” to include only quotations disseminated under an NMS Plan or, in
other words, displayed by the SIP. The SIP exists side by side with proprietary
data feeds. Information about revised quotations or completed trades may reach
traders through proprietary feeds faster than through the SIP, offering an arbitrage opportunity to the trader that can win the race to a venue displaying a stale
price. 127
Commentators have noted that the SIP displays the same best quotations as
proprietary feeds “almost all” of the time. 128 The relevant question, however, is
not the duration of arbitrage opportunities, but whether their aggregate magnitude is sufficient to encourage more socially wasteful investment in speed at the
margin. The evidence on this issue is mixed. 129

126. See, e.g., Matteo Aquilina, Eric Budish & Peter O’Neill, Quantifying the HighFrequency “Arms Race”: A Simple New Methodology and Estimates 5 (Becker Friedman Inst. For
Econ. Univ. Chi., Working Paper No. 2020-86, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3636323; Eric Budish, Peter Cramton & John Shim, The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response, 130 Q.J. ECON. 1547, 1553 (2015). The latter paper shows that
“sniping” of stale quotes is a problem even when traders are all fast. Because messages to the exchanges are processed in the order received, every message to adjust a quote must arrive before any
order to trade at the stale price to prevent sniping. Differential speed tilts the playing field in the fast
traders’ direction.
127. The SEC’s proposed changes to its market data rules would require SROs to transmit
data to the competing consolidators using the same means and at the same speed as the proprietary
feeds. See infra note 175.
128. See PHIL MACKINTOSH & KA WO CHEN, THE NEED FOR SPEED IV: HOW IMPORTANT IS
THE SIP? KCG TRADING STRATEGIES & MARKET ANALYTICS 1 (2016).
129. Ding and co-authors find that differences between the SIP data and private data feeds are
sufficiently frequent to impose costs on active traders despite their brief average duration. See
Shengwei Ding, John Hanna & Terrence Hendershott, How Slow is the NBBO? A Comparison with
Direct Exchange Feeds, 49 FIN. REV. 313, 323 (2014) (“Although price dislocations have small
effects on infrequently trading investors, investors that are continuously in the market can be substantially disadvantaged.”). A recent estimate is that HFTs earn approximately $5 billion per year
globally from latency arbitrage of all types. See Aquilina, Budish & O’Neill, supra note 126, at 50.
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Any arbitrage at all between the SIP’s prices and those on the proprietary
feeds is an artifact of regulatory design. It is also impossible to eliminate under
the current regulatory framework, as data will always have to travel farther to
go from an exchange to the SIP to a trader than directly from the exchange to
the trader.
To the extent that Regulation NMS generates “too many” races from one
venue to another, it also likely generates “too many” complex order types at
those venues. 130 In recent years, exchanges have introduced many new order
types beyond the traditional market and limit orders. This, too, is not inherently
surprising or problematic. As trading becomes automated, the discretionary decisions that floor brokers once made have to be automated as well. New order
types with multiple levels of conditionality can mimic a broker’s discretionary
decisions whether and when to display, withdraw, or reprice an order.
New order types are also, however, the ultimate in colocation—they build
parts of the HFTs’ algorithms into the logic of the matching engine itself. And
like colocation and proprietary data feeds, the demand for complex order types
is likely inflated by the proliferation of exchanges and the resulting multiplication of pathways from one venue to another.
Electronic trading also alters the ways in which large traders attempt to conceal the size of their orders to reduce price impact. In a floor-based system, a
large institutional purchaser could leave an order with a floor broker who would
“work” the order, disclosing trading interest when the broker believed it could
be done without moving prices significantly. 131 Alternatively, the broker could
contact a dealer in the “upstairs” market that might be willing to take the other
side of the trade at an attractive price if it believed that the institution’s trade
was not motivated by information. 132
In an electronic environment, so-called dark liquidity takes the place of
these strategies. Dark liquidity refers to trading methods that do not require that
the institutional trader reveal its intentions to the rest of the market. It can include internalization by a dealer. 133 In addition, exchanges typically allow nondisplayed orders, in other words, bids or offers that sit in the queue but are not
included in the publicly-displayed data (and as a result typically have lower ex-

130. See Hester Peirce, Meeting Market Structure Challenges Where They Are, 43 J. CORP. L.
335, 356 (2018); see also PHIL MACKINTOSH, DEMYSTIFYING ORDER TYPES 3 (2014) (“Exchange
fragmentation is a big part of the order complexity problem.”).
131. See Angel, Harris & Spatt, supra note 2, at 25; see also Yuk-Shee Chan & Mark Weinstein, Reputation, Bid-Ask Spread and Market Structure, 49 FIN. ANALYST J. 57, 60 (1993) (noting
that a floor broker uses reputation to signal to specialist that order is uninformed).
132. Another alternative would be “sunshine” trading, in which the large liquidity trader preannounces the direction and size of its trade as a means of signaling that it is uninformed. See Anat
R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, SUNSHINE TRADING AND FINANCIAL MARKET EQUILIBRIUM, 4 REV.
FIN. STUD. 443, 444–47 (2015).
133. See Carole Comerton-Forde, Katya Malinova & Andreas Park, Regulating Dark Trading: Order Flow Segmentation and Market Quality, 130 J. FIN. ECON. 347, 347–48 (2018) (describing dealer internalization).
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ecution priority than displayed orders). 134 Finally, ATSs can and do choose not
to display their quotes publicly, thereby foregoing trade-through protection.
They offer a means for investors not to reveal their intentions until they have
found a counterparty.
Dark liquidity, like HFTs and complex order types, is not inherently objectionable. It also, however, interacts in likely unintended ways with Regulation
NMS. The OPR produces order routing that may not be in the trader’s best interests. A large trader may desire to bypass a venue if its best quote is for a
small size in favor of a venue with a slightly worse price but a large displayed
size as part of a strategy to minimize price impact. Trading on an exchange offering a better price but a small size may tip the large trader’s hand.
Institutional buyers can partially alleviate the problem through an “intermarket sweep order” (ISO). An ISO permits a trader to buy (or sell) all the
shares available at the NBBO while simultaneously buying (or selling) the
shares available on one or more other exchanges at the best prices available on
those exchanges, even though inferior to the NBBO. 135 An exchange may execute an order marked as an ISO at its best price even though a better price is
available on another exchange.
An ISO alleviates but does not solve the large trader’s problem. Only an
exchange’s best-priced orders are protected for purposes of the OPR. By rule,
an ISO executes only against protected orders. 136 If the sizes of protected orders are small in relation to the large trader’s needs, the large trader will want to
execute against orders at an exchange’s second-best price, but those orders may
disappear as soon as the ISO is entered. ISOs also impose substantial informational and compliance burdens on the executing broker, making them an expensive means of working an order.
The OPR is therefore likely part of the reason for the proliferation of dark
pools. 137 Absent the OPR, it would be easier for large traders to use the “lit,” or
publicly-displayed, markets without tipping their hands. This, in turn, should
result in more liquidity in the lit markets. While dark liquidity has always existed and would exist without the OPR, repeal of the OPR would likely lead to a
shift in trading from dark to lit markets, potentially maintaining overall liquidity
while enhancing displayed liquidity. 138

134. Davies & Sirri, supra note 1, at 166–67.
135. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(31) (2020) (defining “intermarket sweep order”); see also id.
§§ 611(b)(5), (6) (establishing exemptions to Order Protection Rule for intermarket sweep orders
and block trades executed simultaneously with intermarket sweep orders).
136. Id. § 242.600(b)(31)(ii) (noting that an ISO executes against a “protected” bid or offer).
137. See Marshall E. Blume, Competition and Fragmentation in the Equity Markets: The Effect of Regulation NMS 9 (Rodney L. White Ctr. for Fin. Rsch., Working Paper No. 02-07, 2007),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=959429.
138. See Comerton-Forde, Malinova & Park, supra note 133, at 349 (finding that a Canadian
rule change requiring dark venues to offer price improvement enhanced lit liquidity and had a benign effect on overall liquidity).
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HFTs, new order types, and dark liquidity are analogous to strategies or institutions that existed in the manual markets and have important roles to play in
automated markets. This is not, however, to say that more is always better.
There is reason to suspect that Regulation NMS encourages more of each than
is socially optimal.
C. Regulation NMS Discourages Innovation in Trading System Design
As of the mid-1990s, there was a clear distinction between Nasdaq’s quotedriven dealer model and the NYSE’s order-driven auction model. 139 In one, investors searched the quotes of competing market-makers and transacted with
the one offering the best price. In the other, investors entered limit and market
orders to a central auctioneer/dealer who matched orders or provided price improvement by trading for its own account.
This is no longer the case. All of the regulated exchanges now operate electronic limit order books that trade continuously. 140 This would be unobjectionable had the electronic continuous auction emerged as the winner in a competition among different trading systems. The convergence on a single model,
however, is the consequence of exchanges’ need to operate within the constraints of existing market structure rules. As Harris puts it, “[t]he order handling rules, unlisted trading privileges, Reg ATS, and Reg NMS all helped homogenize trading systems in the United States.” 141
To take an example, Regulation NMS would make it difficult for an exchange to experiment with a periodic call auction during the trading day. Current markets are continuous—as soon as a buy and a sell order can be matched,
they are. Continuous markets rely on the willingness of immediacy providers—
market-makers in a prior era, HFTs currently—to trade against incoming market
orders in return for a spread.
An alternative model is a call auction, in which trades do not execute continuously. Instead, orders are cumulated over time. Periodically, an auctioneer
determines a market-clearing price and executes all trades that can be made at
that price. A batch auction process is easily automated.
There are plausible (although not conclusive) arguments that batch auctions
would be an improvement on continuous trading. For smaller, less liquid
stocks, a low-frequency auction, perhaps every hour, could cumulate the trading
interest of natural buyers and sellers over time and allow them to interact directly, rather than each trading with an intermediary. For larger stocks, high139. See JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 115–16 (2016), for a
discussion of the difference.
140. See Application from Edward S. Knight, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Couns., Nasdaq to
Hon. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 13 (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/265-31/26531-3515735-162293.pdf (“Currently, all exchanges in
the U.S. operate electronic limit order books.”).
141. Lawrence Harris, The Homogenization of U.S. Equity Trading 2 (Univ. S. Cal. Marshall
Sch. Bus., Working Paper, 2011) (on file with author).
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frequency auctions, perhaps every few milliseconds, could reduce latency arbitrage and other advantages of speed while allowing near-instantaneous reflection of fundamental information. 142
The OPR would substantially complicate auctions during the trading day.
The high-frequency call auction model involves a delay, albeit brief, between
order entry and execution. Without regulatory relief, this would mean that the
exchange running the auction would forfeit trade-through protection. 143 Transactions following a low-frequency call auction might themselves constitute illegal trade-throughs if a better-priced order arrived at another market shortly before the auction. The relevant exchange would have to incorporate procedures
to “clean up” any orders in other markets before executing trades at the auction
price, complicating what would otherwise be a simple single-price auction.
The open of the NYSE and Nasdaq operates similarly to a call auction, cumulating orders and executing them at a single opening price. The OPR contains a specific exception for trade-throughs that occur at a single-priced transaction at the open of a trading center. 144 Without obtaining similar regulatory
relief, it would be a challenge to comply with the OPR while operating a periodic call auction. No U.S. exchanges currently operate auctions other than at the
open or close.
ATSs are not subject to Regulation NMS and may change their trading procedures without SEC approval. There is more innovation in trading design
among ATSs. 145 Some, in fact, operate periodic auctions. This suggests that
regulatory constraints deter exchanges from innovating on trading design. They
have little incentive to incur the regulatory costs involved because the exchanges capture part of the revenue generated by latency arbitrage through fees for
proprietary data and colocation. 146
The IEX introduced a modest innovation by incorporating a speed bump, or
a 350-microsecond delay between order entry and execution, in order to reduce
latency arbitrage. 147 One might accordingly conclude that innovation remains
possible within Regulation NMS’s constraints. Alternatively, one might note
that IEX’s modest innovation delayed and complicated its registration as an exchange. Other trading venues might conclude that they should operate as an
ATS unless they are willing to operate identically to the existing exchanges. 148

142. See Budish, Lee & Shim, supra note 6, at 5.
143. See Mahoney & Rauterberg, supra note 68, at 243–44.
144. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(b)(3) (2020).
145. See Rauterberg, supra note 11 (manuscript at 15–16).
146. See Budish, Lee & Shim, supra note 6, at 2 (“[I]ncumbent stock exchanges’ private incentives to innovate their market designs are misaligned with social interests because they earn
economic rents from the arms race for speed.”) (italics in original).
147. See Mahoney & Rauterberg, supra note 68, at 270.
148. One popular market commentator argued that IEX’s speed bump is not a significant innovation, but rather a variant on the rebate strategies that other exchanges use to lure particular
types of traders. See Kurt Dew, IEX One? IEX Two? The Speed Bump Must Go, SEEKING ALPHA
(June 14, 2017), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4081500-iex-one-iex-two-speed-bump-must-go
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Absent competition based on different trading systems, exchanges compete
for orders based on access fee structures. Exchanges charge fees to brokers
who execute trades on their markets. The Access Rule caps those fees but does
not keep an exchange from specifying which party (buyer, seller, passive, active) pays the fee. Nor does it prevent an exchange from rebating a portion of
the fee to one party or the other.
As a result, there are currently two dominant access fee models known as
“maker-taker” and “taker-maker” (or “inverted”). 149 In the first, the active party, meaning the one that initiates the trade via a marketable order, pays a fee.
This might be the regulated maximum of three-tenths of a cent per share, known
in the business as 30 mils. The passive party, or the one that entered the resting
limit order with which the incoming marketable order was paired, receives a rebate, perhaps 25 mils. In an inverted model, the payments are reversed, with
the passive party paying the fee and the active party receiving the rebate.
Once the innovation of a rebate was introduced, other exchanges followed
suit in order to compete for limit orders. This, in turn, produced additional pricing innovations. One is the tiering of rebates. Exchanges do not give all brokers an identical rebate, but tailor rebates to trading volumes. There is some
indication that the tiers have proliferated to such an extent as to become, in effect, individually negotiated fee levels. 150
The popularity of maker-taker pricing also created an incentive for some
exchanges to switch to inverted pricing. Because the broker representing a limit
order pays a fee for executions on an inverted exchange (and gives up the potential rebate of a maker-taker exchange), it will post to inverted exchanges
when it perceives that the probability of achieving an execution at a maker-taker
exchange is low at the order’s current limit price. The broker or its customer in
effect pays a fee of less than one cent rather than improve the limit price by a
full cent. This is one of the deleterious effects of the current fragmented system
for liquidity and price discovery, a point to which I will now turn.

(noting that to genuinely innovate, “IEX must do more than manipulate the NMS. It must confront
and destroy the NMS.”).
149. See Carole Comerton-Forde, Vincent Grégoire & Zhuo Zhong, Inverted Fee Structures,
Tick Size, and Market Quality, 134 J. FIN. ECON. 141, 141 (2019) (“The most common model is the
make-take fee model . . . . More recently, three exchanges . . . have adopted an inverted fee model. . . .”).
150. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INV. ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATION
REGARDING EXCHANGE REBATE TIER DISCLOSURE at 2 (2020).
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D. Compared to a Consolidated Market, Regulation NMS Discourages
Aggressive Orders
Shortly after the ITS went into effect, an SEC report concluded that it had
not produced an improvement in bid-ask spreads. 151 Indeed, a market consisting of multiple venues operating identical trading systems can produce worse,
and less informative, quoted prices than a single consolidated market. The reason is that a consolidated market includes a primary (price) and secondary
(time) priority rule. 152 Among limit orders at the same price, the one that has
been in the system longest is the first to execute.
Time priority creates two important incentives. First, it encourages traders
to enter orders early rather than waiting to see what others are doing, thereby
promoting price discovery. Second, it encourages them to bid up to (offer down
to) their reservation prices. Once a trader puts a limit order into the queue, it
cannot jump ahead of others except by improving its price. This incentive for
vigorous competition among orders is a central benefit of consolidating trading
on a single platform.
In the existing National Market System, nearly every stock trades on nearly
every exchange. The OPR imposes a rule of cross-market price priority, but not
time priority. As a result, the probability that a limit order will execute is weakly related to the time at which it is entered. Relative to a price/time priority system, the NMS system does not penalize traders for waiting to enter an order.
This encourages free riding on the information contained in other traders’ orders.
A strategy called quote matching is an extreme form of free riding. 153 Fast
traders observe limit orders entered by slow traders and then trade on the same
side of the market, recognizing that if prices move against the fast trader, it can
simply sell to or buy from, as the case may be, the slow trader at the latter’s
original quote. Quote matching reduces the returns to investments in information and thereby reduces the informativeness of prices. 154
Traders in the current market do not have as strong an incentive to improve
their prices when they find themselves at the back of a long queue as they
would in a consolidated market. If thirteen exchanges are trading a particular
stock, and all happen to be quoting the same prices at a given moment in time,
then there are thirteen queues of varying lengths. A broker representing an incoming market order would have no reason to prefer one exchange to the other
(apart from fee structures). It might therefore make more sense for a limit order

151. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE INTERMARKET
TRADING SYSTEM: 1978-1981, at 48–49 (1982); see also Ferrell, supra note 103, at 1063–66 (arguing that a guarantee of execution at the NBBO is insufficient to induce aggressive pricing).
152. Other secondary priority rules (such as size priority) are possible, but I will ignore them
for the sake of clarity.
153. See LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR
PRACTITIONERS 248–50 (2003), for a description of quote matching.
154. See id. at 250–51.
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trader to search for the exchange at which it will be closest to the head of the
line rather than to improve its price.
Alejandro Bernales et al. document precisely such behavior in a European
market. They conclude that “Our results suggest that competition in market design, not fragmentation, drives previously documented improvements in market
quality when new trading venues emerge; in the absence of such competition,
market fragmentation is harmful.” 155
This is a concrete respect in which Regulation NMS’s linked market is inferior to an actually consolidated market. It is why the SEC initially proposed a
central order file recognizing price and time priority.
In principle, the SEC could revise Regulation NMS to require a central order file and impose both price and time priority. This would be, in effect, a
CLOB. A CLOB might or might not be a superior system to the existing one
depending on the SEC’s ability to act as a public utility regulator. As discussed
in more detail in the next subsection, this is not a simple matter.
Another theoretical solution would be to allow traders to quote in continuous or nearly continuous, rather than discrete, pricing increments, thereby eliminating the advantage of being first in line at a given price. 156 At present, the
minimum tick size, or price increment, is one cent for most stocks. In principle,
an exchange could allow price improvement in extremely small amounts, such
as a billionth of a cent, to jump to the head of the line. Each trader could then
be in a line by itself at a given price. Price/time priority would become price
priority only.
This is not to advocate extremely small tick sizes, but simply to recognize
that tick size and priority interact. In any event, Regulation NMS generally bars
bids or offers priced in increments less than one cent. 157
E. Regulation NMS Interferes with Brokers’ Efforts to Serve Their Customers’
Interests
Absent the OPR, we would expect brokers normally to route customer orders to the venue offering the best price. While price is not the sole component
of execution costs, it is a very important one. A broker will nearly always view
price as the most important execution attribute for a small, uninformed order.
Large orders are more complicated because the cost of execution includes price
impact as well as the bid-ask spread. Venues might compete for large orders

155. Alejandro Bernales et al., A Tale of One Exchange and Two Order Books: Effects of
Fragmentation in the Absence of Competition 1 (Sustainable Architecture for Fin. in Eur., Working
Paper No. 234, 2018).
156. See Chen Yao & Mao Ye, Why Trading Speed Matters: A Tale of Queue Rationing under Price Controls, 31 REV. FIN. STUD. 2157, 2157–58 (2018) (discussing interaction between tick
size and time priority).
157. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.612(a) (2020). Nevertheless, fee rebates create an effective system
of half-penny pricing. See Yao & Ye, supra note 156, at 2163 n.6 (discussing the prevalence of
prices being listed at fractions of a cent as result of rebates).
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with a structure that permits traders to hide order size until they have found
counterparties willing to trade. 158 A broker handling a large order might choose
to route a large order there while bypassing a market offering a slightly better
price but a small displayed size.
The OPR, however, results in orders being first routed to the market displaying the best price even if this does not minimize execution cost, all things
considered. The purpose of the rule, therefore, is not to protect the broker’s
customer but to protect traders who enter limit orders. In effect, the rule imposes a universal duty to “reward” traders who enter the best-priced limit orders. 159
It thereby interferes with a broker’s desire to route orders based on its own customers’ best interests.
F. Regulation NMS Makes the SEC a Public Utility Regulator, a Task for
Which it is Poorly Suited
Under current practices, brokers pay exchanges for access to data and for
executing trades. In both instances, Regulation NMS has at best failed to increase the competitiveness of prices and may have reduced it. As a consequence, the SEC has become a public utility regulator, overseeing the prices of
both services.
1. Data Fees
As previously noted, exchanges must provide the SIP with their top of book
quotations and last transaction prices, also known as “core” data. The Securities Acts Amendments allow the SEC to recognize either an exclusive processor/seller or multiple processors/sellers of the SIP’s core data. It also gives the
SEC regulatory authority to regulate the fees of any exclusive information processor to ensure that they are fair and reasonable. 160 From the creation of the
consolidated quotation system to date, the SEC has chosen an exclusive processor model and therefore regulates fees for core data. Because each exchange is
the exclusive provider of its proprietary data, the SEC also has the authority to
regulate those prices.
The SEC is not well-suited to be a public utility rate regulator. Its original
mandate was to protect investors by improving corporate disclosure practices

158. See Harris, supra note 107, at 276 (“Large traders therefore prefer market structures that
allow them to find parties willing to trade while minimizing the information that they must expose
to find these parties.”).
159. See Jonathan Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Orders to Markets, 28 REGUL. 62, 68
(2005) (“[T]he SEC has reinterpreted the duty of best execution as a general duty to the markets,
rather than as a particularized contractual obligation”).
160. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k-1(b) (exclusive processor registration requirement), 78k-1(c)
(grant of rulemaking authority) (2018).
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and deterring fraud and manipulation. 161 Its organization and staffing reflect
that mandate. The agency is dominated by lawyers; each of the four current
Commissioners and the nominee for the fifth seat (as of July 2020) is a lawyer. 162 The economists on its staff have traditionally been experts in finance,
not industrial organization.
The SEC’s performance as a rate regulator has been unimpressive. Initially,
it simply accepted core data fees negotiated between the exchanges through
their captive Plans, on the one hand, and groups representing broker-dealers and
institutional investors, on the other. 163 Only under sustained pressure from the
D.C. Circuit did the SEC reluctantly begin to question fee levels.
In 1999, as part of a concept release seeking comment on its review process
for core data fees, the SEC justified its light-touch stance. 164 Congress had not
intended to turn the SEC into a “ratemaking” agency, the release argued, but
instead allowed it to adopt a “more flexible approach than ratemaking.” 165 The
Commission’s primary objective was not cost-based pricing but
(1) the wide availability of market information, (2) the neutrality of fees among
markets, vendors, broker-dealers, and users, (3) the quality of market information—its integrity, reliability, and accuracy, and (4) fair competition and equal
regulation among markets and broker-dealers . . . . [t]he Commission has relied to a
great extent on the ability of the SROs and Plans to negotiate fee levels that are acceptable to SRO members, information vendors, investors, and other interested par166
ties.

The SEC took the same approach to proprietary data. Initially, exchanges
did not charge for proprietary data. Its primary value was to give large traders
“depth of book” information, or information about the prices and sizes of quotations inferior to the current NBBO. The rise of HFTs, however, increased the
demand for speed. The exchanges, therefore, began charging for proprietary
data, which reaches subscribers more rapidly than the SIP’s data. 167
In 2008, the SEC approved an NYSE Arca rule change imposing a fee for
proprietary data. Consistent with its stance on core data, the SEC declined to
review the amount of the fee, concluding that competition for orders among

161. In addition to its investor protection mandate, Congress more recently instructed the SEC
to “promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2018).
162. See Davies & Sirri, supra note 1, at 148 (“[F]or the most part the SEC tries to stay away
from price regulation.”); see also id. at 150 (“[T]he SEC is a consummately legal body.”).
163. See, e.g., In re Bunker Ramo Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 15,372, 16 SEC Docket
285 (Nov. 29, 1978) (approving fees by Options Price Reporting Authority for access to SIAC
transactions data for exchange-traded options).
164. See Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, supra note 13, at 70,629–30.
165. Id. at 70,619 (citation omitted).
166. Id. at 70,622.
167. See Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, at
8–9 (October 16, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/2018/34-84432.pdf [hereinafter
SIFMA Application].

Fall 2020]

Equity Market Structure Regulation

33

trading venues would hold data fees to a reasonable level. 168 The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and a coalition of internet
firms challenged the SEC’s approval.
In 2010, the D.C. Circuit held that, while the SEC could consider competition among trading venues as a factor in determining whether fees are fair and
reasonable, the record did not include evidence sufficient to sustain the SEC’s
decision. 169 The court faulted the SEC’s failure to consider issues that would
typically come into play in an antitrust case, such as market definition and demand elasticity. 170 The failure was hardly surprising, as these concepts were
not part of the SEC’s regulatory vocabulary and equity market structure was not
part of the traditional concern of antitrust scholars.
After additional procedural skirmishing resulting from Dodd-Frank Act
amendments to the procedures for SRO rule filings, SIFMA’s challenge to the
NYSE Arca fees returned to the SEC, which consolidated it with a similar challenge to Nasdaq’s proprietary data fees. In 2016, an SEC administrative law
judge ruled in favor of the exchanges, concluding that broker-dealers’ ability to
direct orders to the exchange of their choice (within the OPR’s constraints) gave
them sufficient bargaining leverage to keep the exchanges from charging a monopoly price for proprietary data. 171
Meanwhile, the SEC had suffered another D.C. Circuit loss in a fee case,
this one involving the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC). 172 The court concluded that by deferring to the OCC’s view of the reasonableness of its allocation of costs between its members and nonmembers, the SEC “abdicated [its]
responsibility.” 173
Facing the prospect of continuous litigation over data fee approvals, the
SEC abandoned its light-touch stance. It reversed its administrative law judge’s
decision in favor of NYSE Arca and Nasdaq, concluding that the exchanges had
failed adequately to justify the fee level. 174 It similarly ruled against the OCC,
concluding that it had failed to present sufficient evidence supporting its rule
changes. 175

168. Id. at 1.
169. See NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 537–544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (remanding to SEC
for further proceedings).
170. See id. at 542–43 (noting that the availability of substitutes insufficient to demonstrate
competitiveness absent evidence of interchangeability and prices of substitutes and elasticity of demand).
171. See Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Initial Decision Release No. 1015, at
31 (June 1, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/2016/id1015bpm.pdf.
172. See generally Susquehanna Int’l Grp. v. SEC, 866 F.3d 442 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
173. Id. at 446.
174. SIFMA Application, supra note 167, at 28.
175. See generally Order Disapproving Proposed Rule Change Concerning the Options Clearing Corporation’s Capital Plan, Exchange Act Release No. 85,121 (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/occ/2019/34-85121.pdf.
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The SEC subsequently engaged in a burst of activity with respect both to
core and proprietary data fees. In May 2019, its staff issued guidance on fee
filings. 176 The guidance makes clear that in the future, exchanges will have to
provide detailed evidence to justify increases in their fees for proprietary data.
In general, that evidence will consist either of an antitrust-style analysis of the
relevant market sufficient to demonstrate competitive pricing or a public utility
ratemaking-style analysis of the costs of providing the service. Preliminary data
suggest that exchanges will have a difficult time mustering evidence that the
demand for their data is highly elastic. 177 If so, the exchanges will have to
demonstrate their fixed and marginal costs of providing data and argue about
what is a reasonable rate of return.
With respect to core data, the SEC recently abandoned its longstanding
preference for exclusive provision of the SIP’s data, proposing instead a system
of multiple, competing data vendors in hopes that this will reduce the Plans’
pricing power. 178 At the same time, it proposed to expand the definition of core
data to include some of what is now proprietary data. Should the SEC adopt the
proposal, exchanges will have to provide this expanded core data to the competing data vendors for dissemination and sale. As of July 2020, the SEC has not
yet adopted the proposal.
The provision for decentralized, competing data providers is an important
step toward competitive pricing. Collectivizing even more of the exchanges’
data, however, risks making the exchanges less interested in the quality and integrity of that data, which could hamper price discovery. 179
Most recently, the SEC has ordered the exchanges to submit a revised, consolidated Equity Data Plan to replace the three current Plans. 180 Importantly,
the new Plan will no longer be governed exclusively by the exchanges but will
include broker-dealer and institutional investor representatives, among others.
The governance rules will also be revised so that groups of exchanges, such as
CBOE, Nasdaq, and NYSE, will receive a single vote rather than one for each
separate exchange within the group. The unstated but obvious objective is to
produce core data fees that will be less subject to judicial challenge.

176. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF GUIDANCE ON SRO RULE FILINGS RELATING TO
FEES (2019), https://www.sec.gov/tm/staff-guidance-sro-rule-filings-fees.
177. See Ike Brennan, Are Stock Market Data Fees Higher than the Law Allows?, FORBES
(Sept. 26, 2019, 2:40PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ikebrannon/2019/09/26/are-stock-marketdata-fees-higher-than-the-law-allows/.
178. See Market Data Infrastructure, supra note 9.
179. See Supriya Sarnikar & D. Bruce Johnsen, Cybersecurity in the National Market System,
6 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2009) (raising this concern with respect to the collectivization of data
generally).
180. See Order Directing the Exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to
Submit a New National Market System Plan Regarding Consolidated Equity Market Data, Exchange Act Release No. 88,827, 85 Fed. Reg. 28,702 (May 13, 2020). The three current Plans cover
last-sale data, quotation data, and data regarding Nasdaq stocks traded on exchanges. See id. at
28,703.
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2. Access Fees
Exchanges individually determine prices for executing trades. The OPR,
however, removes one critical driver of competition, which is consumer choice.
In a normal competitive market, a consumer can decide whether it is cheaper,
all things considered, to pay a fee to join a membership-only wholesale club
like Costco or shop at a grocery store that does not require a membership but
charges slightly higher prices.
A broker’s choice of trading venue, by contrast, is constrained. The OPR
provides that Exchange B may not execute a trade if Exchange A is displaying a
better price for that stock at that time. Even if the broker representing a market
order would prefer to trade on Exchange B, it cannot do so unless and until Exchange A is no longer displaying a better price. In practical terms, then, a broker wishing to transact immediately in that situation must send the order to Exchange A and incur whatever fee it charges for execution.
This constraint on broker choice gives each exchange more pricing power
than it would otherwise have. The SEC has again had to step in as a price regulator. The Access Rule requires that exchanges not unfairly discriminate among
traders in granting direct or indirect access to the market. 181 As noted above, it
also caps access fees at $0.003 per share.
That cap appears to be comfortably above the market price of execution
services. 182 The SEC may therefore have assumed that competition among
venues would hold fees below the cap and the SEC could declare its mission
accomplished. However, the exchanges took the Access Rule as a license to
move to a nominal fee of $0.003 and then rebate most of that fee through a
maker-taker or inverted fee model.
The SEC accordingly faced criticism for facilitating these fee models. 183
The rebates create new conflicts of interest between customers and their brokers, who typically retain the rebate. Specifically, they create incentives for
brokers to route customer limit orders to the market that offers the highest rebate rather than the one that offers the highest probability of execution.
In response to these criticisms, the SEC announced in 2018 that it would run
an experiment with alternative fee structures known as the Access Fee Pilot.
The Access Fee Pilot would temporarily impose varying caps on access fees
and rebates on different traded stocks to assess the effects on market quality and
liquidity. 184

181. 17 C.F.R. § 242.610(a) (2020).
182. Budish et al. conclude that the net fee paid for trade execution averages about $0.0002
per share, or less than a tenth of the regulatory cap. See Budish, Lee & Shim, supra note 6, at 4.
183. See, e.g., Robert Battalio, Shane A. Corwin & Robert Jennings, Can Brokers Have It
All? On the Relation between Make-Take Fees and Limit Order Execution Quality, 71 J. FIN. 2193,
2196 (2016) (finding a “negative relation between take fees and limit order execution quality”); Angel, Harris & Spatt, supra note 2, at 39 (“Make-or-take pricing has significantly distorted trading in
the National Market System.”).
184. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.610T (2020).
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The NYSE, Nasdaq, and CBOE promptly sued the SEC on the grounds that
its approval of the Access Fee Pilot was arbitrary and capricious. 185 The D.C.
Circuit ruled in June 2020 that the agency lacks the statutory authority to adopt
the Access Fee Pilot. 186
Commentators have noticed the increasing willingness of regulated entities
to sue the SEC. As the Wall Street Journal put it, “suing a company’s regulator—an uncommon and aggressive tactic—is becoming less taboo as the SEC
tries to flex its muscles.” 187 A more accurate way to put the point might be that
lawsuits are becoming less taboo now that the SEC can substantially enhance or
diminish the pricing power of regulated entities, creating potentially dramatic
distributional effects. 188 The SEC is responding with changes to Regulation
NMS in hopes that procedural fixes can produce more competitive prices. I
propose below that a more fundamental rethinking is needed.
G. So What?
An obvious response to these concerns is that on objective measures, U.S.
equity markets serve investors better today than at any time in the past. 189 Why
should the SEC change a system that performs its essential functions at such a
low cost?
There is scant evidence that the core of Regulation NMS—the separate-butlinked trading environment and supporting features such as the OPR—has
much, if anything, to do with the secular improvements in the functioning of
U.S. equity markets. Instead, those improvements are largely due to exogenous
developments and other regulatory changes.
The fall in retail brokerage commissions cannot be a consequence of Regulation NMS because it is a decades-long phenomenon. 190 Congress’s and the
SEC’s decisions to end the fixed commission system in the 1970s, which was

185. See Petition for Review at 2, N.Y. Stock Exch. v. SEC, No. 19-1042 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14,
2019).
186. See N.Y. Stock Exch. v. SEC, 962 F.3d 541, 546 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
187. Cezary Podkul, Proxy Advisory Firm Sues SEC Over New Rules, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1,
2019, 3:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/proxy-advisory-firm-sues-sec-over-new-rules11572600608.
188. The SEC action described in the Wall Street Journal article cited above is an example.
See id. In 2004, the SEC’s staff issued guidance permitting investment advisors to meet their fiduciary obligations by voting shares in conformance with recommendations by third party advisors regardless of certain conflicts of interest to which the advisors were subject. At present, there is a
powerful duopoly of proxy advisory firms. The SEC became concerned that these firms were exercising excessive power and walked back its prior guidance. See SEC 17 C.F.R. § 271, 276 (2016). It
simultaneously interpreted proxy advisor recommendations as “solicitations” under the proxy rules.
See 17 C.F.R. § 241 (2016). The latter interpretation, in particular, threatened the power of the advisory firm duopoly, resulting in the lawsuit.
189. See Angel, Harris & Spatt, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that “[v]irtually every measurable
dimension of US equity market quality has improved” since the beginning of the century).
190. See id. at 16 fig.14 (showing a decrease in retail brokerage commissions).
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itself prompted by the rise of institutional investors, initiated a long secular decline in retail brokerage commissions.
Similarly, the fall in bid-ask spreads followed changes in tick size, not the
OPR or other commands to the exchanges to more effectively link the markets.
Effective bid-ask spreads fell in two discrete steps as the minimum tick size fell,
first from eighths to sixteenths, then from sixteenths to decimals. 191 The largest
drop occurred after the completion of the move to decimalization (that is, making the minimum pricing increment for most stocks one cent) in 2001. 192 It is
also notable that bid-ask spreads for the stocks of small-capitalization companies have not improved in line with those of large-cap companies. 193 This is a
small piece of evidence for the proposition that Regulation NMS’s one-size-fitsall model may not fit small-cap stocks very well.
The entry of new exchanges in Europe in the mid-2000s was associated
with a prompt improvement in market quality and reductions in trading costs. 194
At that time, Europe’s regulatory system was transitioning from the Investment
Services Directive of the mid-1990s to the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive. 195 It is unlikely that regulatory commands which were not yet effective,
and certainly not commands to link markets, were responsible for the rise of
competition. Technology and innovation are the more likely causes. 196
In short, there is ample reason to believe that the SEC could replace Regulation NMS with a simpler system without adverse effects on commissions, bidask spreads, or other measures of market quality. Certain regulatory changes—
ending fixed commissions, rejecting limits on off-exchange trading, and moving
to decimal pricing—reduced investors’ costs. Replacing the heavy hand of
Regulation NMS with a lighter and simpler set of principles would not undo
those changes.

191. See Tarun Chordia, Richard Roll & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Liquidity and Market
Efficiency, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 249, 256 (2008) (noting that effective spreads “experienced three distinct regimes corresponding to subperiods for the eighth, sixteenth, and decimal minimum tick sizes”).
192. The SEC in 2000 required the exchanges and Nasdaq to submit plans to price securities
in decimal increments, with all listed securities priced in decimals by April 9, 2001. See Order Directing the Exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to Submit a Phase-in
Plan to Implement Decimal Pricing in Equity Securities and Options, Exchange Act Release No.
42,914, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,010, 38,013 (June 19, 2000).
193. See Angel, Harris & Spatt, supra note 2, at 10 (“The downward trend in spreads, which
is so visible for the larger stocks, has not been as uniform for smaller stocks.”).
194. Menkveld, supra note 119, at 338–39.
195. The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive was adopted in 2004 with a 2-year transition period. See Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC).
196. See Albert J. Menkveld, High Frequency Trading and the New Market Makers, 16 J.
FIN. MKTS. 712, 717 (2013) (“Instinet pre-empted MIFID when it launched Chi-X . . .”).
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IV. MOVING FORWARD
The time has come for a fundamental rethinking of equity market structure
regulation. The SEC should repeal Regulation NMS and replace it with a less
prescriptive and less intrusive set of design principles. Those design principles
should include issuer choice, exchange autonomy, and regulatory consistency.
A. Issuer Choice
The SEC can and should require that an exchange receive the issuer’s consent before it offers trading in a stock. As matters now stand, any exchange that
wishes to trade a security may do so by extending unlisted trading privileges
(UTP) to that security. 197 In practice, nearly every exchange trades nearly every
listed stock. 198 This system reflects Congress’s and the SEC’s policy judgment
that giving exchanges broad authority to trade stocks listed on other exchanges
would foster competition and thereby reduce investors’ trading costs. 199
The problem with the policy stance is that we do not know whether dispersing trading among competing markets or consolidating it on a single market
maximizes liquidity. 200 The current system assumes that regulators are best
placed to make that determination. 201 A better system would recognize that issuers are in a superior position. Although managers of public companies are
subject to their own agency problems, they still have stronger incentives than
exchanges, broker-dealers, or the SEC to maximize liquidity for their stock. 202

197. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(f) (2018) (noting that “any national securities exchange may . . . extend
unlisted trading privileges to . . . any security that is listed on a national securities exchange” subject
to certain exceptions).
198. Application from Edward Knight, Exec. Vice President and Gen. Couns., Nasdaq, Inc.,
to Hon. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 25, 2018) (on file with the Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n).
199. See, e.g., Unlisted Trading Privileges, Hearing on H.R. 4535 Before the H. Subcomm. on
Telecomm. and Fin. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong. 3, (1994) (statement of
Rep. Fields) (noting that the bill would remove “outdated restrictions” “to ensure that monopolies
are not being protected and that competition, not regulation, determines where stocks will trade.”);
id. at 38 (testimony of Brandon Becker, Director, SEC Market Regulation Division) (suggesting
that, by streamlining approval process for UTP, the bill would “enhance[e] the opportunity for competition among markets”).
200. See Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, supra note 3, at 200–01.
201. See Jonathan Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Stock Transfer Restrictions and Issuer Choice
in Trading Venues, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 587, 605 (2005) (the SEC “has taken a dim view of
issuers’ efforts to restrict the trading venue of their securities, once those securities have been
listed”). Macey and O’Hara argue that issuers could use share transfer restrictions to consolidate
trading on a single venue at the time of an IPO.
202. See Dale A. Oesterle, Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded it Congressional Mandate to Facilitate a “National Market System” in Securities Trading?, 1 NYU J. L. & BUS. 613, 653
n.165 (2005) (noting that issuers might choose trading venues in their personal interests rather than
in shareholder interests). While this is undoubtedly correct, it is not a complete answer to whether
issuers should be allowed to select a venue. Exchanges are subject to competitive forces, but so are
managers (in the labor and capital markets).
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The choice between (relatively) consolidated or dispersed trading is likely
unimportant for the largest and most heavily-traded stocks. They are popular
trading and investment vehicles, meaning that their liquidity is mostly exogenously determined and relatively insensitive to the structure of the market(s) on
which they trade.
There is a debate about whether the liquidity of smaller and more thinlytraded stocks is also mostly exogenously determined or whether consolidating
their trading on a smaller number of venues could enhance liquidity. 203 Some
market professionals argue that small-company stocks that trade on many venues are less liquid than those trading on fewer venues. 204 There is empirical evidence that dispersed trading has a positive effect on liquidity for large stocks
but a negative effect for small stocks. 205
Fortunately, it would be a simple matter to permit issuers to experiment
with different levels of consolidated or dispersed trading. The SEC has the
statutory authority to require issuer consent as a condition of extending UTP for
a given stock. 206 The SEC could also require issuer consent as a condition of
trading on ATSs since the statutory provisions governing UTP do not apply to
ATSs.
Dealer internalization is not currently regulated as either an exchange or an
ATS, so limiting trading to a single exchange would not prevent it. On the other hand, should a smaller issuer choose to have its shares traded on only one exchange, dealers might find it preferable to expose their buying or selling interest
to that exchange rather than trying to trade alongside it. In short, the starting
assumption should be that internalization will not adversely affect liquidity.
Should that assumption prove incorrect, the SEC can address it at a later date.
The latter point is of more general applicability. My arguments throughout
are premised on the notion that technology has made the market for trading platforms more competitive than it was when Congress instructed the SEC to create
a national market system in 1975. Should the SEC observe specific non-

203. See Davies & Sirri, supra note 1, at 159 (“Market fragmentation may be a greater concern for small capitalization issuers . . . .”).
204. On April 23, 2018, the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets held a roundtable on
market structure for thinly traded securities. See generally Sec. Exch. Comm’n. Division of Trading
and Markets: Roundtable On Market Structure For Thinly-Traded Securities (April 23, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/equity-market-structure-roundtables/thinly-traded-securitiesrountable-042318-transcript.txt. Several participants expressed the view that suspension of UTP
might enhance liquidity for thinly traded stocks. See id. at 73, 97, 113, 233, 235.
205. See Peter Haslag & Matthew C. Ringgenberg, The demise of the NYSE and NASDAQ:
Market Quality in the Age of Market Fragmentation 2 (Working Paper, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2591715 (“Our findings present new evidence that the reduced transaction
cost effect [of fragmentation] dominates for medium and large-capitalization stocks, leading to improvements in market quality, while the negative network externality effect dominates in smallcapitalization stocks, leading to a reduction in trading and market quality.”).
206. Although Section 12(f) of the Exchange Act empowers any exchange to extend UTP to
any listed security, the SEC has the authority to impose “additional procedures or requirements” for
extending UTP. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(f)(1)(D) (2018).

40

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

[Vol. 10:1

competitive practices in the simpler system I outline, it has ample authority to
introduce tailored solutions. It need not, however, retain an entire system initially designed to break down the NYSE’s walled garden of fixed commissions,
off-exchange trading restrictions, and limited access.
B. Exchange Autonomy
The National Market System requires exchanges to act against their own interests and sometimes those of brokers and traders in pursuit of the SEC’s goal
of combining the best of competitive and consolidated market structures. Exchanges must maintain an order-routing system, a consolidated tape, and a consolidated quotation system that they did not create for their own purposes and
that generate the various problems outlined in Section III.
The entire system should be replaced by one that gives exchanges, and by
extension brokers and traders, the autonomy to select their strategies and succeed or fail accordingly. An exchange should be free to select the trading rules
and terms of access that it thinks will attract orders from traders and their agency brokers, who in return should be free to trade or not trade on that exchange.
The OPR, Access Rule, and related rules are unnecessary to ensure that
brokers can and will search for the best price. To the extent the OPR was intended as a backstop to the broker’s duty of best execution, it is expensive overkill. The SEC should offer additional guidance on best execution or step up its
enforcement against brokers if it believes they are intentionally failing to seek
superior executions for customers.
The OPR’s other objective—to reward the limit order trader offering the
best price—sometimes conflicts with the objective of best execution. The SEC
should concede that its attempt to force market participants to act against selfinterest to pursue an abstract notion of fairness to limit order traders is costly
and does not achieve its objective of encouraging those traders to quote aggressively.
Because of the significant positive externalities associated with transaction
data, exchanges should be required to publish that data in real time (although
possibly with a delay for data on transaction size to encourage large traders to
trade in lit markets). 207 Given current communications technologies, there is no
need for a central processor to consolidate these. Brokers can get feeds directly
from exchanges and create their own consolidated tape.
Exchanges should, however, be able to set the terms of access to their quotations rather than selling them collectively through one or more Equity Data
Plans. One might argue in opposition to that idea that the market’s experience
with proprietary data feeds shows that giving exchanges the right to determine
fees is a bad idea. Current proprietary data fees are high enough to induce brokers to mount legal challenges. The reason may have to do with network ef-

207.
(2013).

See Larry Harris, What to Do about High-Frequency Trading, 69 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 6, 7
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fects. Quotation data from different exchanges are complements, meaning that
a broker buying data from one exchange has an incentive to buy from all the
others. 208 Competition among exchanges for orders may therefore not ensure
competitive pricing for data. 209
Another possibility, however, is that private data feeds are expensive primarily because they are a “speed technology” that facilitates latency arbitrage. 210 Eric Budish and co-authors offer a model with homogeneous exchanges and fixed entry costs and identify a possible equilibrium in which exchanges
share rents with HFTs by charging high prices for data and colocation. Empirically, they estimate that exchanges capture about 30% of rents through data
fees. 211 If Budish et al. are correct, then eliminating Regulation NMS would be
the sort of regulatory “push” that could spur innovation and eliminate the
rents. 212
Moreover, in a system that gives issuers a choice of trading venues, competition for listings may reduce data fees. Given the right to choose where its
shares will trade, an issuer would have an incentive to insist on low data fees.
Lower costs will mean more brokers connecting to the exchange and therefore,
at the margin, more orders submitted and greater liquidity.
Even if the system I outline does not produce competitive data fees, brokers
and their customers will be no worse off than they are now. The SEC currently
regulates prices for both core and proprietary data. In a world without Regulation NMS and automatic UTP, it might still have to do so—but it might not. In
either event, giving exchanges more control over their quotation data will give
them stronger incentives to maximize data quality and integrity. 213
C. Regulatory Consistency
At the time of the 1975 amendments, exchanges were closed, memberowned organizations whose rules governed not merely the mechanics of trading
but the business conduct of their member brokers and the corporate governance
and disclosure practices of their listed companies. Since that time, exchanges
have demutualized and offloaded most of their role as broker-dealer regulators
to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Specialists and market makers have been largely replaced by HFTs that do not undertake formal
obligations to the exchanges to maintain a continuous market. Meanwhile, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act usurped the few remaining areas

208. Lawrence R. Glosten, Economics of the Stock Exchange Business: Proprietary Market
Data 3–8 (Working Paper, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533525.
209. Id. at 2.
210. See Budish, Lee & Shim, supra note 6, at 2.
211. Id. at 3–4.
212. See id. at 6–7.
213. See generally Sarnikar & Johnson, supra note 179.
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in which exchanges had regulated the corporate governance practices of listed
companies. 214
There is no longer a good reason to insist that exchanges be SROs. 215
FINRA and the SEC can and should absorb their remaining regulatory role.
Necessarily, then, there is no longer a need for trading platforms offering services that are close substitutes to be subject to different regulatory regimes. The
lighter-touch approach of Regulation ATS could be extended to all trading platforms.
Trading platforms may currently choose to register as an exchange or register as a broker-dealer and operate as an ATS. ATSs, unlike exchanges, may
maintain control over the quotations in their systems. They need not submit
their rules for the SEC’s approval. The SEC should eliminate the distinction
and adopt a simplified and unified regulatory system for all multiple-to-multiple
trading markets, meaning any market that allows multiple buyers to negotiate
with multiple sellers and that executes the resulting trades. 216 The markets
should have broad authority to determine their trading environments and associated rules without SEC approval.
A side benefit of the system I’ve described is that, by removing SRO status
from exchanges, the SEC could make clear that their business practices are subject to antitrust scrutiny on the same basis as any other business. The SEC
might identify certain practices, such as any exchange rule or procedure that attempts to prevent or penalize a subscriber from routing an order to another market on which the stock is traded, as anticompetitive. Similarly, any collusion
among exchanges in setting fees or other terms would be banned—unlike the
current system, of which collusion through the Plans is an integral part.
D. Can We Get There from Here?
Regulation NMS likely contributed to the proliferation of trading venues
and gave exchanges more pricing power. Its replacement might reverse these
trends. Some trading venues would see themselves as potential losers in a different competitive environment and would resist change. 217 They would argue

214. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2018) (noting that the SEC shall direct SROs to require
independent audit committees); id. § 78j-3 (noting that the SEC shall direct SROs to require independent compensation committee); id. § 78j-4 (noting that the SEC shall direct SROs to require recovery of erroneously awarded incentive-based executive compensation). See also id. §§ 7241–7266
(including officer attestation of financial reports, forfeiture of CEO and CFO incentive compensation in event of accounting restatement, management assessment of internal controls, code of ethics
for senior financial officers).
215. Cf. Macey & O’Hara, supra note 201, at 591–93 (drawing a similar conclusion).
216. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16(a) (2020) (defining an “exchange” as a multiple-to-multiple
facility).
217. See Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, supra note 3, at 201 (“[A]ny attempt to reverse the decision for multiple venues would meet stiff resistance from those who have built businesses based on
an assumption that the multivenue structure will continue.”).
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that Regulation NMS helped create the markets’ current blend of low costs and
high liquidity and its replacement would harm investors. While, as noted
above, I believe the evidence does not support that argument, it might reinforce
regulators’ natural tendency to move slowly. 218
On the other hand, as the SEC is discovering, even incremental changes that
interfere with exchanges’ pricing power generate massive pushback. Within a
month of the SEC’s order to the exchanges to revamp the Equity Data Plans, the
Nasdaq family of exchanges petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review. 219 Perhaps
more fundamental change would be no more painful in the long run.
There are signs that the SEC is willing to consider more than small, incremental changes to Regulation NMS. Commissioner Hester Peirce has argued
that “as we progress with further market structure reforms, we should be willing
to consider eliminating rules that interfere with—or even foreclose—efficient
methods of communication or market interactions rather than imposing additional rules that merely mitigate the effects of prior regulatory choices.” 220 The
SEC has held multiple roundtable discussions on market structure topics in
which industry and academic participants have discussed potential reforms. 221
The SEC could travel a significant distance with one straightforward rulemaking. It could act on my suggestion above and adopt a rule requiring issuer
consent before an exchange extends UTP to a stock. The Treasury Department
has recommended that the SEC consider permitting UTP suspension for smallcompany stocks. 222 Extending an issuer consent principle to all stocks would
not go much farther, since large companies would likely grant consent routinely. As part of the same rulemaking, the SEC could amend Regulation ATS to
require issuer consent before an ATS trades a stock. The rule should also ensure that exchanges do not impose unreasonable burdens preventing an issuer
from changing its listing or UTP status as its needs change.
The next priority should be to repeal the OPR. Several of the unintended
consequences of Regulation NMS described in Part III above stem from the
OPR. Its repeal would facilitate competition in market structure as opposed to
the current system in which largely identical markets compete for order flow
through complicated pricing structures.
Without the OPR and its resulting mandatory order routing, exchanges
could not attract orders without reasonable fees and other terms of access.
There should accordingly be no more need for the Access Rule’s provisions on

218. See Gallagher, supra note 3, at 7 (noting “the incrementalism that invariably leads regulators to attempt to solve every problem, however small, in a vacuum.”).
219. See Exchange Act Release No. 89,066, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,921 (June 18, 2020) (denying
stay pending legislation).
220. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks before the SIFMA
Equity Market Structure Conference (April 18, 2018).
221. See Equity Market Structure Roundtables, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N.,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/equity-market-structure-roundtables (last modified Oct. 17, 2019).
222. See Mnuchin & Phillips, supra note 7, at 60.
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fees. Out of an abundance of caution, however, the SEC could continue to require nondiscriminatory access.
The next step would be more disruptive to the current system. That would
be to replace the NMS Plan(s) with a rule simply requiring real-time public access to last-transaction data. The exchanges would then gain control over their
quotation data. Perhaps this would get the SEC out of the business of regulating
prices. Even if it doesn’t, the SEC would simply have to continue its current
oversight of the prices of proprietary data feeds.
At that point, the SEC would have instituted issuer choice and exchange autonomy. The remaining task would be to free exchanges from their role as
SROs and give them similar regulatory treatment to ATSs. Issuer and broker
choices, not regulatory mandates, would determine which trading venues and
systems will survive.
V. CONCLUSION
The SEC has disclaimed a desire to dictate the way in which exchanges
trade stocks or the fees they charge for their services. By a series of gradual
steps, however, the SEC finds itself doing both.
Increasingly, the SEC’s incremental changes to its market structure regulations address shortcomings of prior regulatory changes. The SEC could continue down the same path. It could reduce the maximum fee for execution access,
require broker-dealers to pass rebates along to their customers, introduce more
competition into the Equity Data Plan(s), and require exchanges to provide their
proprietary data to the SIP. These changes would respond to some of the most
visible unintended consequences of Regulation NMS.
Alternatively, the SEC could step back and ask whether a system that requires such constant recalibration is a good system. I have argued that it is not.
It could and should be replaced with a simple set of principles—issuer choice,
exchange autonomy, and regulatory consistency. These will allow exchanges to
innovate, brokers to focus on their customers’ interests, and issuers to pursue
stock price maximization through liquidity maximization.

